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These past six months have been a time of re-
flection not only for me personally but also 
for the ever-evolving field of humanitarian 
mine action (HMA). After ten years of serving 
as CISR director, I have decided to accept a 
position as a tenured political science profes-
sor at James Madison University and pursue 
physical, spiritual, and writing goals. It has been an honor work-
ing with you as CISR Director during this exhilarating period for the 
HMA community. My successor, CISR Associate Director, Dr. Suzanne 
Fiederlein, is taking my position as Interim Director. I wish her and 
the wonderful, second-to-none team at CISR all the very best in this 
exciting time. 
We have a very full Journal for this issue focused on topics in-
cluding Southeast Asia and the Baltics, humanitarian IED clear-
ance in Afghanistan, the use of augmented and virtual reality (VR) 
in mine action, as well as mine risk education apps and demining 
training aids. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA
• Ta Thi Hai Yen from Catholic Relief Services writes about 
their digital game-based MRE application for children rang-
ing in age from eight to twelve. The app has features in both 
Vietnamese and English and can be downloaded for free from 
Google Play and Apple. 
• Authors Katrin Stauffer (RISKey GmbH) and Christelle Mestre 
(GICHD) write about the “Long-Term Risk Management Tool 
and Protocols for Residual Explosive Ordnance Mitigation: A 
Pretest in Vietnam” and the development of the framework 
of the Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War 
(MORE) project. 
• Leading on from the MORE project, Allan Vosburgh writes 
about GWHF’s work in Vietnam, training the Vietnamese 
Provincial Military Command to international standards with 
the goal of enabling Vietnamese institutions to transition 
from proactive clearances to reactive responses. 
• Kimberley McCosker and Jan Erik Støa, (edited by Katherine 
Harrison) (NPA) discuss the joint publication, Cluster Munitions 
Remnants Survey: Best Practice in South East Asia, resulting 
from close cooperation between HALO, MAG, and NPA where 
lessons learned and agreed best practices are summarized 
for survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants in 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 
• Bernard Franck, Donna Koolmees, and Sarah French from 
USAID Okard World Education, Inc. write on the develop-
ment of their Community-Based Inclusive Development 
Demonstration Model which implements disability-inclu-
sive policies in Laos. A second article about Laos is from 
Akihito Ontoku Hayashi (former JICA Advisor to UXO Lao) on 
improving the prioritization process of clearance activities by 
various organizations operating in Laos.
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
• Alexander Tan from HALO writes about the development of a 
humanitarian IED clearance capacity in Afghanistan, specifi-
cally on the manual clearance of victim operated IEDs, and 
trialing safer and more efficient methods for the targeted 
clearance of abandoned improvised mines. 
• Mohammed Al-Husseini, Masoud Alipour, Hassan Ghaziri 
(Beirut Research and Innovation Center), and Ali El-Hajj 
(American University of Beirut) present a real-time video 
transmission system—the Demining Monitoring System—
that can be employed to monitor the activity of deminers 
during clearance operations. 
UNDERWATER DEMINING
• Focusing on the Baltics and underwater demining, Torsten 
Frey (Leipzig University), Jacek Bełdowski (Polish Academy 
of Sciences), and Edmund Maser (Kiel University) discuss new 
tools for mine action operators the challenges of ERW and 
chemical warfare agents in the sea. 
VR IN MINE ACTION 
• Sandra Bialystok (GICHD) looks at how a virtual reality expe-
rience illustrates how IEDs are impacting people’s safe return 
home through the immersive VR experience Home After War 
produced by NowHere Media and the GICHD. 
• Allen Dodgson Tan from the Golden West Design Lab discuss-
es how their team has been applying augmented reality and 
VR technologies to create the Augmented Reality Ordnance 
Learning System (AROLS).
And finally, we feature a thought-provoking contribution from Lt. 
Col. Sean Kadlec from 20th CBRNE Command on the complex gray 
zone of post-conflict HMA and how using the strengths of the mili-
tary and civilian organizations, as well as better communication and 
cooperation, can help to offset each other’s respective weaknesses. 
Having returned in November from the Fourth Review Conference 
of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention meet-
ing in Oslo, Norway, I am encouraged by the call for more meaning-
ful participation of landmine survivors and people with disabilities. 
The World Health Organization estimates that 15 percent of the 
world population lives with a disability. Therefore, I would like to 
call on all organizations and governmental entities involved in HMA 
to set a target for employing survivors and people with disabilities 
by the Fifth Review Conference. Related to this call for action, the 
Summer 2020 issue of The Journal is seeking articles on victim assis-
tance and the integration of disability rights in HMA. For more infor-
mation, please see our call for papers at https://www.jmu.edu/cisr/
journal/cfps.shtml. We’d love to hear from you.
Ken Rutherford
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How do the military, other government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the pri-vate sector cooperate with each other when they find 
themselves conducting mine action tasks typically considered 
the purview of each other’s sectors? 
As demonstrated in Iraq and elsewhere, armed conflicts 
rarely end in immediate peace. More broadly, conflict does 
not only concern direct violence between adversaries. It may 
involve anything from nonviolent forms of influence (i.e., soft 
power) to the use of proxy states or nonstate actors, who wage 
war against each other on behalf of other states (e.g., American 
and Russian use of proxy forces in Syria). These realities mean 
humanitarian mine action (HMA) programs will increasingly 
take place in a gray zone—that space between armed conflict 
and peace, in which military and civilian agencies must oper-
ate simultaneously.
In response to the complexity of an operational environ-
ment without clearly demarcated states of peace and war, the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) conceived what it 
calls the competition continuum; first put forward in the Joint 
Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) and then further 
developed in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19. In turn, the U.S. 
Army continues to refine Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 
as the future operating concept for employing its capabilities 
across the competition continuum, to support U.S. national 
security policy and goals. The HMA community, along with 
the broader stability and development communities, should 
understand these concepts and ideas, because the “competi-
tion” in the gray zone is not about delineating military and 
civilian roles. Rather, it is about military and civilian organiza-
tions finding appropriate circumstances in which to best em-
ploy their capabilities or to defer to others’ capabilities when 
needed. It behooves the international HMA community— 
military, government, NGO, and private sector—to develop 
methods of cooperation and collaboration that apply across 
the competition continuum. Despite recognizing the need 
for better civil-military integration, the DoD has not codified 
a doctrinal concept or idea for how to effectively collaborate 
with other government agencies, NGOs, or the private sector. 
However, the private sector and academics have created many 
models of partnership and collaboration continuums that can 
serve as an intellectual foundation for developing compli-
mentary efforts between civilian and military organizations. 
We should look to them as a starting point to improve gray-
zone cooperation in circumstances that force the military into 
overlapping its traditional mission space with those of other 
HMA operators.
According to editors of The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, “[t]he existential differences be-
tween conflict and post-conflict are becoming increasingly 
blurred.”1 The U.S. DoD has defined this space as “competi-
tion below armed conflict.” It may involve anything from non- 
violent forms of influence (e.g., cyberattacks, economic sanc-
tions, security assistance, etc.) to the use of proxy states or 
nonstate actors, who wage war against each other on behalf of 
other states. The situation in Mosul, Iraq, exemplifies a gray 
zone: though the Iraqi military retook Mosul, nonstate actors 
continued attacking the city with improvised explosive de-
vices (IEDs) and conventional munitions.2 Syria provides an 
even more complex example of a gray zone. Within the broad-
er Syrian conflict, the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Iran 
are using proxy forces to advance their national interests in 
the region and disrupt their adversaries’ interests.3 As a result, 
there are limited military forces from these countries oper-
ating in Syria, certainly not enough to establish security and 
to begin stability operations akin to post-war efforts in Iraq 
or Afghanistan.4 These circumstances, highlighted by a lack 
of armed conflict between national militaries, pose “jurisdic-
tional” challenges to military forces, government agencies, 
and the civilian sector.
Such gray zones, in “limbo” between peace and armed con-
flict (or, “large-scale ground combat operations” in current 
U.S. Army parlance), are just enough at peace to dispatch non-
military HMA operations into them. However, there is still 
just enough war to keep military forces deployed in them as 
well. This may trigger an overlap among military forces and 
civilian aid organizations conducting mine action (or other 
stability operations) in the gray zone.
GRAY ZONE
HMA in the 
by Lt. Col. Shawn Kadlec [ 20th CBRNE Command ]
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To better address different sectors’ overlapping efforts in that 
middle ground between war and peace, it is useful to examine 
the DoD’s JCIC, which describes the gray zone as comprising a 
“competition continuum – a flexible spectrum of strategic rela-
tions that range from cooperation to competition below armed 
conflict to armed conflict itself.”5 The U.S. Joint Staff’s JDN 
1-19 further describes the competition continuum as “endur-
ing competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, 
competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.”6 
The competition continuum does not replace the artificial 
peace/war dichotomy of the past with an artificial trichotomy; 
nor does it envision distinct transition points between coop-
eration, competition, and armed conflict. Rather, it seeks to 
describe an environment in which the United States may si-
multaneously cooperate and compete with other interna-
tional actors. For example, the United States cooperates with 
China on anti-piracy operations while competing with China 
regarding freedom of navigation.6 Similarly, the DoD could 
find itself conducting HMA activities in cooperation with ad-
versarial states, or as a competitive response to counter ad-
versary influence in a country or region important to United 
States interests. Among competitors with the United States, 
China has a growing HMA program and international out-
reach (e.g., China recently donated mine-clearing equipment 
to Cambodia).7 In response, the United States could refo-
cus or increase spending on military and civilian HMA pro-
grams as part of a larger national and international strategy 
to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as an alternative to 
China’s Belt-Road Initiative.8 While the civilian HMA com-
munity already operates alongside military forces, competi-
tion below armed conflict will intensify the geopolitical role 
of HMA and of other facets of stability operations.
JDN 1-19 also provides a lexicon that defines the geopoliti-
cal goals and strategic objectives of military activities along 
the competition continuum. The three broad ideas of com-
petition—armed conflict, competition below armed conflict, 
and cooperation—also contain a range of military objec-
tives, which should mirror country-specific policy goals and 
whole-of-government efforts (see Figure 1). Importantly, JDN 
1-19 uses the DoD’s Law of War manual, which is based on na-
tional and international law, as a basis for defining the vari-
ous forms of armed conflict and lethal activities that span the 
continuum.6 Competition below armed conflict and cooper-
ation apply to the civilian-HMA community because this is 
Z – Anti-U.S. Terrorism 
Z – Anti-U.S. Terrorism 
X – Encroachment 
at expense of A
X – Encroachment at
expense of A
Y – WMD proliferation
Y – WMD proliferation
X – Countering WMD
proliferation to Y
X – Countering WMD
proliferation to Y
A – Resisting
encroachment of X
A – Resisting
encroachment of X
Degrade
Deny
Defeat
Contest
Counter
Maintain
Improve
Engage Selectively
Advance
Competition
Below Armed Conflict
Armed Conflict
Cooperation
    
Y increases
proliferation activity
Group Z seizes
territory
Election in ally A
New administration
alters priorities
Incident with X in
disputed area
Figure 1. Depiction of the competition continuum and examples of friendly and adversary activities along the continuum. The black 
boxes enclose military objectives along the continuum.
Figure courtesy of Stephen Marr, Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald, Hiram Reynolds, and Hannah Smith.5
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where the lines between military and civilian HMA tasks blur 
in post-conflict and geopolitically contentious environments. 
These DoD terms, concepts, and definitions have implica-
tions for the international HMA community because the DoD 
will conduct its HMA activities under this construct and as-
sociated legal norms. Specifically, understanding DoD objec-
tives associated with the cooperation and competition below 
armed-conflict portions of the continuum will allow others 
to assess DoD’s commitment to country-specific HMA pro-
grams, and will enable cross-sector organizations to identify 
appropriate opportunities and methods for cooperation with 
DoD forces. 
Similarly, the Army’s MDO concept will affect the HMA 
community because MDO includes stability operations and 
HMA activities conducted by Army forces.9 Within the MDO 
concept, a return to competition provides an example of how 
the ideas within the Army’s MDO concept may affect civil-
ian HMA organizations: “In the return to competition [be-
low armed conflict], Army forces conduct three concurrent 
tasks: physically secure terrain and populations to produce 
sustainable outcomes; set conditions for long-term deterrence 
by regenerating partner and Army capacity; and adapt force 
posture to the new security environment.”10 To achieve these 
results though, military forces must also address armed con-
flict’s governmental, social, and economic disruptions in ad-
dition to the immediate security situation.6 HMA helps DoD 
to address these disruptions and to produce sustainable out-
comes through land clearance, securing weapons and mu-
nitions, and (re)generating partner-military capabilities and 
capacities needed for safer living environments.11 This af-
fects civilian HMA organizations because DoD’s HMA ac-
tivities can influence how the host-nation plans, prioritizes, 
and supports military and civilian HMA operations over the 
long term. As a result, military and civilian HMA entities may 
find themselves more and more intertwined—especially when 
military-led efforts transition to “whole of government” sta-
bilization efforts, led by the Department of State (DoS) or by 
other civilian agencies. 
How well the diplomatic, information, military, and eco-
nomic instruments of national power converge across the 
competition continuum will factor prominently during 
competition below armed conflict, especially during the 
Stragetic 
Support 
Area
Operational
Support 
Area
Tactical
Support 
Area
Friendly area;
where
strategic and
national forces
gain their
combat power,
sustain
operations,
and project
power into the
Support,
Close, and
Deep Areas
Friendly area;
where
operational
 forces gain
their combat 
power, sustain
operations, and
project power
into the
Support, Close, 
and Deep
Areas
Friendly area;
where tactical
 forces gain
their combat 
power, sustain
operations, 
and project
power into the
Close and 
Deep Areas
Friendly areas in the
competitor’s “near abroad,”
the focus of their strategic
aims which U.S. forces and
allies must protect, defend,
and liberate; when necessary,
ground forces operate here
Competitor’s
non-permissive
area where all-
domain fires
originate,
targetable by
friendly; only
SOF ground
forces operate
here
Competitor’s
non-
permissive,
policy-
restricted
area,
all-domain
fires originate
Close Area
Deep
Maneuver
Area
Operational
Deep Fires
Area
Strategic
Deep Fires
Area
5,000s+km 1,500s+km 1,000s+km500s+km 500s+km200s+km
Distance from Normandy to Berlin
Return to Competition
[below armed conflict]
•   Relatively secure, but prone to
     violence
•   Zones of political, social, and
    economic disruption
•   Overlapping military and civilian
    HMA and other stability tasks
•   Activities across the entirety of the
    competition continuum may take
    place in these areas
Active combat
operations
Figure 2. The linear battlefield is typically associated with large-scale ground-combat operations (e.g., World War 
II).12 Using World War II as a hypothetical example, HMA activities could have taken place throughout France, 
Belgium, etc. as the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas progressed into Germany.
Figure adapted from The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.13
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unstable periods immediately following armed conflict. The 
Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR)—a joint report by the 
U.S. DoD and the U.S. DoS—assessed such convergence in 
several, recent post-conflict environments and identified how 
convergence may fail. The SAR recommends that the U.S. 
Government assign DoS as the lead federal agency for stabi-
lization, with the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the DoD as supporting elements, due “to the lack 
of institutionalized DoD mechanisms to enable regular collab-
oration with interagency and international partners.” However, 
as noted in the SAR, the U.S. Government places security re-
strictions on government civilians. This limits their ability to 
deploy to conflict and post-conflict zones.13 The potential in-
ability of DoS and USAID to establish a forward presence in 
conflict or post-conflict environments will, presumably, re-
quire the DoD to lead the convergence of U.S. Government 
capabilities with cross-sector HMA programs as part of the 
overall military effort during the early stages of stability oper-
ations in post-conflict environments. DoS will continue to be 
the lead federal agency for HMA programs and should assume 
responsibility once the security situation permits. However, it 
will likely have a military “face” in the immediate aftermath of 
large-scale, ground-combat operations. 
Figure 2 illustrates a linear battlefield common to large-scale, 
ground-combat operations (e.g., World War II), with the “close 
area” being the front line commonly referred to in Hollywood 
movies. The operational and strategic-support areas (i.e., the 
rear)—established once the front line has passed through an 
area—should be relatively secure and capable of hosting HMA 
activities. While typically not engaged in direct combat, these 
support areas remain active zones of military activity in which 
deep fires (e.g., long-range rockets or ballistic missiles), special 
operations forces (SOF), or nonstate actors (e.g., insurgents) 
will use explosive hazards to disrupt military sustainment and 
stability operations. Furthermore, the political, social, and eco-
nomic disruption caused by war “create conditions for intense 
competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking 
to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a 
new order.”6 Therefore, the security situation in these (loosely 
defined) post-conflict areas may prevent DoS or USAID per-
sonnel from assuming lead responsibility for implementing 
stabilization activities (including HMA). In these circum-
stances, the U.S. Army could opt to use a Security Force 
Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to partner with other security 
forces and use its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or engi-
neer personnel to provide HMA training to military forces or 
local civilians. If so, communication and cooperation between 
military forces and civilian HMA organizations would permit 
mutually-developed (or informed), military HMA programs 
to transfer to civilian authorities and organizations with min-
imal impact to the communities affected by explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW). 
Regrettably, the DoD does not have a doctrinal concept or 
idea for a partnership/cooperation continuum to facilitate 
this kind of communication and collaboration. However, ac-
ademics, business consultants, and others have written ex-
tensively on cross-sector partnerships and collaboration. 
Synthesizing various definitions and models creates a con-
tinuum of potential cross-sector, cooperative relationships 
(Figure 3). On the left, organizations can limit their coopera-
tion to simply exchanging knowledge and information with 
each other to achieve unity of understanding. On the right, 
organizations cede organizational autonomy to integrate 
as teams with comingled-resources, mutually-determined, 
and interdependent goals to achieve unity of command. 
Presumably, most NGO-military partnerships will lie to-
ward the left side of the continuum due to many NGOs’ ad-
herence to the four humanitarian principles of humanity, 
independence, neutrality, and impartiality. Conversely, U.S. 
Government efforts should converge toward unity of com-
mand.14 By operating on a partnership/cooperation con-
tinuum, disparate organizations can effectively address the 
myriad of challenges faced in the competitive gray zone, 
without sacrificing their organizational values and missions.
Partnership Continuum
Low Degree of Trust High Degree of Trust
Coordinating Collaborating Integrating
Limited Understanding Mutual Understanding Empathy
Independent Goals Mutually Supporting Goals Inter-dependent Goals
Separate and
Independent Resourcing
Synchronized, but
Separate Resourcing
Comingled and Inter-
dependent Resourcing
Networking
Unity of Understanding Unity of Effort Unity of Command
Figure 3. Synthesis of various concepts and definitions of “partnerships” and “collaboration.”
Figure courtesy of author.14
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Using a partnership continuum allows military and civil-
ian organizations to identify appropriate circumstances for 
communication and cooperation. Returning to the SFAB ex-
ample, early communication between its EOD forces and the 
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) 
will establish the unity of effort between U.S. Government 
agencies necessary to effectively transfer HMA programs to 
civilian authorities once the security situation permits civil-
ians to enter the area. Furthermore, early communication with 
HMA NGOs identified by DoS will establish the civil-military 
relationships necessary for unity of understanding. When ap-
propriate, NGO input into U.S. Army SFAB-HMA activities 
will nudge the relationship toward unity of effort—thereby 
enabling a more effective military program with a smooth-
er transition to civil organizations. Once on the ground, ci-
vilian organizations must determine to what degree they will 
cooperate or collaborate with military or other government 
forces, especially when they encounter explosive hazards they 
are not trained or equipped to identify, render safe, or dispose 
of (e.g., certain types of IEDs or chemical munitions). If they 
choose not to train and equip themselves to do tasks typical-
ly associated with government forces, then to whom will they 
report hazards, and how will they cooperate with military or 
other government agencies in the area, if at all? Thinking of 
the civil-military HMA relationship as a continuum of op-
tions ranging from networking to integrating allows military 
and civilian organizations to better compete against explosive 
hazards (rather than against each other) in post-conflict (and 
other) environments, while simultaneously sustaining their 
organizational values and purposes. 
In the complex gray zones of post-conflict HMA, more ef-
fective operations require better communication and cooper-
ation between military and civilian organizations. Lingering 
violence often prevents an immediate civilian presence in 
support areas, where combatants’ use of improvised muni-
tions often means civilian HMA organizations are ill-pre-
pared to operate safely. On the other hand, military forces 
do not typically have the expertise or experience to address 
war’s political, social, and economic disruptions. These re-
alities require ongoing understanding and cooperation be-
tween military forces and civilian organizations. To achieve 
this, the U.S. DoD should further refine the JCIC, JDN 1-19, 
and the U.S. Army’s MDO concept by incorporating an idea 
for a range of techniques and processes with which it can 
better cooperate with civilian agencies and organizations. 
Civilian organizations should review military doctrine and 
ideas as well, because they may find the DoD’s gray zone con-
ceptualization useful. From there, they might also contem-
plate the proposed partnership continuum, so that they can 
better prepare themselves to operate just below the level of 
armed conflict in the murky gray zone of post-conflict en-
vironments and alongside the military forces operating in 
them. Collectively, we can achieve better long-term results 
using each other’s strengths at the right places and times to 
offset our respective weaknesses. After all, the competition in 
the gray zone of post-conflict environments is between those 
who would use explosive hazards to perpetuate instability 
and those who seek to solve war’s political, social, and eco-
nomic disruptions. 
See endnotes page 58
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
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large, global audience. The GICHD was selected to 
participate in the program in 2017, and the GICHD, 
NowHere Media, and Oculus used the opportunity to 
focus on the growing challenges that IEDs pose to re-
development and civilian safety in Iraq.
In August of 2018, Home After War had its world 
premiere at the Venice International Film Festival. 
The Venice Festival was one of the first high-profile 
film festivals to include VR experiences in their of-
ficial competition. Seven months later, Home After 
War travelled to Austin, Texas, where it enjoyed its 
North American début at the South by Southwest 
Festival (SXSW). At this event, Home After War 
won the jury award in the category of “Best Use of 
Immersive Arts.” 
Now, just over a year after its official release, there 
has been time to analyze and reflect on the impact 
that Home After War has had thus far. This article 
explores some of this influence, not just in the mine 
action sector but also more widely. It then looks at 
the ways in which VR might be used by the sector 
moving forward.
VR: The Empathy Machine
In 2015, VR was nicknamed “the ultimate empa-
thy machine” by Chris Milk,2 a film producer who 
worked with the United Nations to create the expe-
rience Clouds Over Sidra.3 The term empathy ma-
chine was most likely initially coined by film critic 
Roger Ebert years earlier when he wrote that “film 
is the most powerful empathy machine in all the 
arts,”4 and for better or worse, this moniker has 
been widely associated with VR over the past four 
years. Although many working in VR today are un-
comfortable with this term, it is easy to understand 
why others gravitate toward this shorthand for de-
scribing a medium where state-of-the-art cameras 
can film in 360 degrees and state-of-the-art head-
sets allow users to shut themselves off from the cur-
rent reality and become immersed in another place 
or time period. Because of this fully-immersive, 
A Twenty-Minute Walk
Through Fallujah: 
Using Virtual Reality to Raise 
Awareness about IEDs in Iraq
by Sandra Bialystok, Ph.D. [ GICHD ] | Photos © Felix Gaedtke
In January 2018, filmmakers from the stu-dio NowHere Media travelled to Fallujah, Iraq, with the objective of creating a vir-
tual reality (VR) experience to explain how 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are 
impacting people’s safe return home. In 
just a few days, they met dozens of peo-
ple, all of whom had stories to tell. And then 
they met Ahmaied—an Iraqi father who had 
returned home with his family about a year ear-
lier. Ahmaied told them about the tragic accident 
that had happened just a few months prior when his 
two older sons entered a neighbor’s home to collect 
wood and set off an IED. Both young men lost their 
lives in the explosion. 
Working with a translator from the region and a lo-
cal crew, and with Ahmaied’s permission, NowHere 
Media and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) created the im-
mersive VR experience Home After War to tell his 
story. Using a technique called photogrammetry, 
NowHere scanned Ahmaied’s home by taking thou-
sands of still pictures that were then reproduced to 
create a room-scale version of his home in the VR 
environment. This means that when the viewer puts 
on a VR headset, the impression is that one is ac-
tually in Ahmaied’s home in Fallujah: one step 
taken in real life translates into one step taken in 
Ahmaied’s home. More dramatically, in what re-
sembles a hologram effect, Ahmaied appears with-
in his virtual home and tells his story. He invites 
the viewer inside, and as users walk through the 
space, peeking around corners and even stand-
ing on his roof, they hear about what happened to 
Ahmaied’s family.
This experience came out of the Oculus VR for 
Good Creators Lab.1 The Oculus VR for Good ini-
tiative pairs not-for-profit organizations with VR 
filmmakers, providing them with the resourc-
es they need to make experiences that shed light 
on pressing social issues that are presented to a 
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completely-foreign space, the technology tricks our brains into think-
ing that we are actually present in this new reality. And by extension, 
we open ourselves up to the possibility of empathizing with those we 
meet in these virtual spaces.
Measuring Impact 
To capitalize on the empathy-building potential of VR, Home After 
War was created for two target audiences: the general public and de-
cision makers in mine action. Tailoring the story to a general audi-
ence was logical given the scope of the project. At film festivals and 
international VR conferences, guests have been transported to Iraq to 
meet one person whose life was turned upside down by an IED. By tell-
ing Ahmaied’s personal story, there is the potential to raise awareness 
about how the mine action sector is confronting the growing challenge 
of IEDs in the region. To support this message, a GICHD advisor was 
present in Venice, Italy and in Austin, Texas, to speak with guests about 
the current situation in Iraq, explain more about IEDs, and generally 
answer any questions that might arise after completing the experience. 
place, GICHD exhibited at two high-profile events for the mine ac-
tion community: the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, 26–30 November 2018, and 
the 22nd International Meeting of Mine Action Directors and U.N. 
Advisors, 5–8 February 2019, both held at the United Nations in 
Geneva. Decision makers and leaders—representatives from embas-
sies, missions, and other U.N. agencies—more generally were also 
able to view Home After War at the United Nations Visitors Centre 
in New York, when the piece was included in the UNMAS exhibition 
Safe Ground for six weeks in spring 2019. Among other mine action 
events, the piece was also exhibited at a Swiss Army Humanitarian 
Mine Action event, Humanity and Inclusion’s 25th anniversary 
Pyramide de chaussures in Lyon and Paris, and at a public open house 
of the German Federal Foreign Office.
Defining an audience and presenting it with a new communica-
tion tool is one thing; however, measuring the effect of that tool is 
another matter entirely. While it is possible and relatively straight-
forward to record numbers of viewers or track online engagement, 
In this way, the hard-hitting and moving documentary was paired with 
real-life interaction and information sharing. 
Mine action decision makers constitute an audience of represen-
tatives from donor countries, policymakers involved in mine action 
and disarmament issues, and other high-level representatives work-
ing on human security issues. Indeed, it quickly became clear that tell-
ing Ahmaied’s story was not only an opportunity to take people to 
Fallujah (as far as we know, the NowHere Team was the first interna-
tional media crew to capture the city on film since ISIS lost control in 
December 2016), but also to show the interlinkages between mine ac-
tion, displacement, reconstruction efforts, and victim assistance. One 
intention of Home After War was to initiate a conversation within this 
targeted audience. The goal was to start a discussion about IEDs from 
a place of empathy. To support this growing discussion and bring the 
experience to the greatest number of mine action professionals in one 
measuring whether content has impacted behavior is difficult. 
Indeed, change in behavior is rarely related to a single event but is 
far more often the product of ongoing interactions and encounters 
that are woven together into a tapestry of experiences that ultimate-
ly shapes who we are and what we believe. In an attempt to partially 
unweave this tapestry, the GICHD has been measuring the impact 
of Home After War through a three-pronged approach: tracking 
reach, engagement, and action. 
Reach is the simplest of the three categories. Keeping track of 
reach means recording where the experience has gone and how many 
people have seen it. These are of course important numbers to have 
but do not show the extent to which the experience has impacted the 
individual. The engagement category digs deeper into unearthing 
meaningful impact. The four metrics in this category that GICHD 
is tracking—award nominations, awards received, media mentions, 
11
JOURNAL: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2020
 THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION12
and panel invitations—indicate different ways viewers are inspired 
to bring the message of the experience to their circle. Finally, action 
indicates the deepest form of impact. In these cases, individuals hear 
about the experience from a third party and reach out to NowHere 
Media and GICHD to use the experience for their own outreach and 
education efforts. The numbers in Table 1 reflect that current impact 
assessment as of October 2019. To that end, it has only been since 
about February 2019 that the action category could be measured; un-
derstandably, the experience had to be released and seen before re-
sults in this category could be examined. 
Numbers to Date
Even the combination of these indicators only tells part of the 
story’s impact around the globe. In part this is because tracking the 
meaningful impact of VR is a nascent field. Just as was the case for so-
cial media managers nearly a decade ago, we need time to develop a 
clearer understanding of how people consume VR content and are af-
fected by it before developing standard measures on impact and reach. 
That said, being “on the ground” at mine action events and film festi-
vals and watching people’s individual reactions to the piece has been 
inspiring. We have had Middle East desk officers based in their capi-
tals thank us for taking them to see—for the first time—where their 
beneficiaries actually live. And we have spoken to Iraqis who have 
not been home for many years weep for the homes they once knew. 
Sharing these intimate moments has been an immense privilege, giv-
ing us confidence that VR can have a strong role in shaping people’s 
emotions as well as their decisions to make change in the world.
What’s Next?
After collaborating with VR experts on the Home After War proj-
ect, it is exciting to think through other ways that VR could be useful 
to the mine action sector. In mine action especially, the ability to create 
REACH
Total viewers > 500
Number of film festivals 27
Number of mine action meetings and 
conferences 9
Number of public events and museums 5
Continents reached 4
Countries reached 14
Cities reached 40
ENGAGEMENT
Award nominations 12
Festival awards received 7
Media mentions 30
Invitations to deliver high-level presentations 
(i.e., film festivals, international conferences) 13
ACTION
Number of invitations by mine action 
partners to show experience at their events 7
Requests from museums to use experience 
for an exhibition 2
Table 1. Impact numbers for Home After War.
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a world that contains only virtual hazards has enormous potential for 
expanding training opportunities. Over the past few years, the GICHD 
has experimented with creating two-dimensional virtual worlds for such 
purposes, and Home After War has given the GICHD the insight with 
which to transform these virtual worlds into immersive ones as well. 
The Explosive Weapons Effects Simulator, for instance, was 
launched in 2018 by the GICHD in partnership with Fraunhofer EMI.
The user is given the option of selecting from five different weapon sys-
tems (122 mm BM-21 multi-barrel rocket launcher; 152 mm and 155 
mm artillery guns; 81 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm medium and heavy 
mortars; 115 mm, 120 mm, and 125 mm tank guns; and MK82 aerial 
bombs), and then from five different populated areas (ranging in size 
from hamlet to large city). After selecting a target in the fictitious pop-
ulated area, the potential primary and secondary effects of the chosen 
weapon would have on that area are visualized. This tool is by no means 
meant to be a game but rather a visual device that demonstrates the im-
pact of using non-precision weapons in populated areas through the 
safe, anonymous space offered by this virtual world. Home After War 
has demonstrated one option for how to move from the virtual, flat en-
vironments of the Explosive Weapons Effectives Simulator into a fully 
immersive virtual space. By including VR as a training or educational 
tool as well as benefiting from its storytelling potential, there are mul-
tiple options for how to integrate this technology into the operational 
activities of the GICHD and other organizations. 
The GICHD is not the only organization in the sector to push inno-
vation with this new technology. As is demonstrated in this edition of 
The Journal, Golden West is working in augmented reality (AR) and 
VR to push training efforts forward and create virtual spaces where 
people can learn safely and effectively. Training development is a 
wide-open space in which VR can be effectively used—new environ-
ments, new forms of contamination, and even complicated scenarios 
can be quickly rendered and visited through this technology. 
Home After War is just the beginning. In just a few years the tech-
nologies that created Ahmaied’s home will already seem antiquated. 
However, the telling of Ahmaied’s story and others like it will always 
be critical for shedding light on pressing humanitarian challenges: 
testing the limits of innovation through this form of storytelling has 
the potential to contribute to a safer tomorrow. 
See endnotes page 58
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A t the Golden West Design Lab in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, our team has been working on applying augmented (AR) and virtual (VR) reality technologies to explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD) for approximately three years with the support 
of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA). This 
work grew from our success with the Advanced Ordnance Training 
Materials (AOTM) program, which produces detailed and function-
ing training aids of ordnance fuzes using 3D printing technology. 
The AOTM products were able to provide new training capabilities 
to programs across the world, and we believed AR and VR might of-
fer similar opportunities.
Similar to how 3D printing has changed the accessibility of phys-
ical, engineered products, recent leaps in AR and VR technologies 
made by Oculus, HTC, Google, Samsung, and others have suddenly 
made the production of accessible consumer-grade applications pos-
sible. With capable platforms available, the challenges to implemen-
tation were similar to those we faced with the AOTM product line:
◊ identifying clear design constraints that addressed the needs and 
limitations of the humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector
◊ creating blended technical teams capable of producing our products
◊ creating the customer support infrastructure required for effec-
tive commercialization
◊ marketing these technologies to the HMA community
Augmented and Virtual Reality 
for HMA EOD Training
As we have seen with other bespoke HMA solutions, effective com-
mercialization remains one of the most difficult problems to solve. 
For technologies that make it through the research and development 
phase successfully, considerable barriers to success remain. We are 
continuing to improve this process at the Design Lab and our formu-
la has created a second sustainable product: the Augmented Reality 
Ordnance Learning System (AROLS).
Use Case
The applications of AR and VR technologies are so far reaching 
and fundamentally game changing that we can expect some of the 
same organic spillover into the HMA sector as seen with drone and 
mobile technologies. These kinds of solutions were not designed spe-
cifically for the HMA community but were general advancements in 
human technology. Given the wide range of possibilities AR and VR 
offer, they will eventually apply to almost all aspects of what we do. 
At this early stage, however, our lab is focused on an area where we 
believe significant room to increase safety and efficiency exists in the 
near term: EOD operator training.
When we analyze the HMA EOD workflow, there is room for im-
provement throughout. This begins with initial EOD-technician 
training, whose quality can vary significantly based on instructor, 
candidate profile, curriculum, classroom resources, and national 
standards. Effective areas for intervention through new technologies 
by Allen Dodgson Tan [ Golden West Design Lab ]
In Vietnam, Golden West has deployed the Augmented Reality Ordnance Learning System (AROLS) for use in training the provincial 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. Here an EOD operator is seen reviewing an animation of how a cluster munition functions 
in the field before taking actions on a live unexploded ordnance (UXO). Through these experiences, we see the potential usefulness 
of augmented reality (AR) as an operational tool in the near future.
All images courtesy of the author/Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.
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are most immediately possible in the classroom resources and in 
the curriculum. Through the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS), the community works to address the curriculum issue; we fo-
cus on classroom resources.
The cause for high variability in EOD classroom resources is mostly 
obvious. Funding remains the key issue as it relates to a school’s abil-
ity to purchase or produce expensive inert ordnance training aids. The 
other issue is that there are inadequate resources for this task.
In EOD, we are required to understand abstract concepts (e.g., 
explosive effects and the effect of physical forces on fuze mechanisms 
during the arming and firing sequences). It has always been a challenge 
to convey these concepts to students from diverse educational 
backgrounds. The ability to do so often relies solely on the ingenuity of 
individual instructors. An illustrative example is how some instructors 
seek to illuminate the concept of centripetal force by spinning a rubber 
band around a pen. For less readily demonstrable concepts—such as 
spalling from squash-head projectiles—even the best instructor can 
find themselves without adequate tools to reach students.
This is where we targeted our first products using AR and VR. By 
leveraging our lab’s unique blend of digital engineers, mechanical 
engineers, and in-house EOD expertise, AROLS was designed to provide 
digital solutions to deepen student understanding of fundamental 
concepts. By providing these products on commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) platforms, we are able to create nearly universal availability, 
decreasing the gap between training programs of varied resource levels.
Augmented Reality Ordnance Learning 
System (AROLS)
With a clear understanding of the limitations of conventional 
EOD training and the resource constraints of the HMA sector, our 
team designed our first product to run on Android smartphones: 
ARLOS, a platform that can be purchased and repaired in nearly ev-
ery corner of the globe. Utilizing a software framework developed 
by Oculus and Samsung, the GearVR, we created a software package 
that allows users to visualize the functionality of explosive ordnance 
fuzes on any table using simple markers.
Employing AROLS, users see static ordnance items and anima-
tions of their functioning appear in front of them in photo-realistic 
renderings, which blend seamlessly into the natural environment. 
This effect makes the virtual ordnance seem as though it is there, 
giving an unparalleled realism, which increases the learner’s chanc-
es of retention. It is the difference between watching a video of a pro-
cess and actually witnessing it firsthand. This system is currently in 
use in HMA EOD programs worldwide, though the official launch 
took place at the GICHD Technology Workshop in November 2019.
How it Works
Currently AROLS has 121 unique nomenclatures that include 21 
highly-detailed animations. The AROLS app can be downloaded 
from the Google Play Store to any high-end Android device and can 
be used with or without a VR headset. Once downloaded, the app 
This image is not Photoshopped or manipulated in post-production. You are viewing a screenshot from a fourth device looking at the 
same AROLS marker, using the same equipment as the other three users seen in the photo. The landmine on the table is displaying 
the same way to all four users. Using small group techniques, users can explore ordnance functioning together.
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must be activated through an annual subscription purchased on-
line requiring an identification card and credit card—steps neces-
sary to ensure that users of potentially sensitive EOD information 
are identifiable. Once purchased, this app can be used an unlimit-
ed number of times on the device, potentially serving a classroom 
of students with only a few devices.
In addition to the app, users need a marker card to put on the ta-
ble. This marker allows the app to recognize the surface orientation 
and relative scaling. This is how the software understands where to 
place the virtual object and what the size needs to be. While other 
technologies (surface mapping) exist in higher-end devices (e.g., 
the Microsoft HoloLens), the reliability of these technologies on 
smartphones remains unacceptable at this time.
We produce a set of marker cards made from durable plastic 
that can be purchased separately online, or users can download a 
free printable PDF file. Users in areas without printing accessibil-
ity can also use commonly available currency as markers: the U.S. 
one-dollar note, the five-euro note, and the 
British five-pound note. Additional custom 
markers are possible upon request though 
we expect a transition away from the mark-
er-based system within the next few years, 
as systems like Google ARCore become 
more capable.
Virtual EOD 
Training Room
For scenario-driven training, it is the 
virtual space that offers the most profound 
opportunities. The virtual world is a blank 
canvas on which we can create any world 
or situation. Applying this to HMA EOD, 
we took a similar approach to the AROLS 
process and looked for areas where simula-
tion could create significant leaps in student 
and/or operator capabilities.
The concept we created is the Virtual 
EOD Training Room. This system utilizes 
the HTC Vive to deliver a room-scale VR 
experience allowing users to become fully 
immersed in a complex training scenario. 
Most importantly, the system allows in-
structors to create these scenarios in min-
utes using a simple pick and place interface. It is through empowering 
non-technical users to quickly create these scenarios that we provide 
a tool capable of adapting to the ever-changing set of tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures required for EOD operators.
An example of this would be an urban post-conflict IED-clearance 
scenario. In conventional training, this would take place in a park-
ing lot, football pitch, or at best, an expensive specialized military 
training facility. Fellow team mates would likely be posing as various 
characters and the operator would be asked to pretend buildings were 
The newly-released plastic marker cards (right) are portable and 
durable. The menu cards (left) allow users to select ordnance 
items to display on the marker cards by simply scanning a QR 
code instead of searching through a menu. This form of non-
language-based user interface enables the system to be readily 
used by almost anyone with two minutes’ training. While marker 
cards are not required to use the AROLS system, they provide a 
more reliable user experience and are recommended. They can 
be purchased separately though the Golden West website for a 
minimal fee, or users may print them using an ordinary PC printer 
from a provided PDF file.
A screenshot from a device viewing a 40 mm rifle grenade up 
close. Objects appear to users as though they are floating on 
the marker.
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arranged differently or cars were not where they are. It would be a gi-
ant game of make believe where nearly all the critical details and nu-
ance critical to understanding real-life threats were absent.
Utilizing VR, not only are we able to create and build environments 
that are exactly what the instructor would like to mimic, but we can 
create the dynamic details critical for EOD scene management. These 
could include a person on the roof talking on the phone, random 
crowds of civilians mobbing a scene, or security elements parking too 
close to suspected IEDs. These are the elements that make operational 
EOD so difficult, which, until now, have been nearly impossible to rep-
licate in a training environment.
While we have completed the proof-of-concept phase for this sys-
tem, the development with key customers is still ongoing. Therefore 
we are only prepared to present this short conceptual overview of the 
system; however, we remain open to opportunities for partnership. 
Any interested parties are encouraged to reach out to our lab.
The Near Future
As we complete AROLS, we look to the next leap in the application 
of AR. Our ability to create usable products is wholly dependent on 
the consumer-electronics industry and their ability to deliver suitable 
platforms for our sector. This means platforms that are not only capa-
ble but cost-effective and durable. Fortunately, the AR space is rapidly 
evolving, and each year we see significant improvements. 
The next step for our lab is to move from the training space into the 
operational space, a move that tracks the development of the technolo-
gy itself. As AR goggles become more suited to field conditions, we can 
start applying EOD operational assistance tools to these platforms. We 
have completed a proof of concept in which a user that is wearing AR 
goggles can position a dearmer for an attack against a fuze without 
needing to use handheld measurement tools. The user sees an overlay 
of the appropriate tool placement in their vision and is able to match 
the actual dearmer to that overlay, thereby aligning the shot cor-
rectly without tools.
In the next phase of our digital EOD tools, we will link the 
OrdHUB ordnance technical database to the AR systems. This will 
allow users to both search and visualize search results through their 
head-mounted AR displays. The ideal workflow will be a hands-free 
interface that allows users to identify ordnance by looking at it and 
then retrieving all relevant information and assistance for tool or 
disposal charge placement overlaid on the ordnance item. It is 
through these types of tools that we will eventually create a universal 
standard for the delivery of EOD services. 
For more information about Golden West Design Lab’s augmented 
reality and virtual reality HMA-EOD training, please contact Allen 
Dodgson Tan at allen.tan@goldenwesthf.org. 
An early proof of concept showing how AR can assist users in placing tools. Here you see a mock .50 cal dearmer, which was placed 
in position for an attack on the mortar fuze using only the AR system for reference. In the near future, tools similar to this will short-
en times on target and lower the potential for technical errors during EOD operations.
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T he transition from proactive survey and clearance to reactive risk management represents a crucial moment in the life of a mine action program. Relevant frameworks and standards, in-
cluding the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.10, usu-
ally require that all reasonable effort is applied and a tolerable level 
of risk with regards to a mine or explosive ordnance (EO) threat is 
achieved in order to move to a residual state. Such a transition re-
quires the application of risk management principles, as stressed in 
the IMAS 07.14: Risk Management in Mine Action.1 
CONTEXT-SPECIFIC RISK 
MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY
Despite the existence of such frameworks, there is no universally 
accepted methodology that would help determine what the tolerable 
level of risk is and how to manage residual risk. In the framework 
of the Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War (MORE) 
project, coordinated by the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), a methodology has been devel-
oped and piloted with the aim of enhancing national authorities’ ca-
pacities to identify, evaluate, and manage residual risk. 
Appreciating the context-specific nature of tolerable risk, defined 
as a “risk which is accepted in a given context based on current val-
ues of society,”2 the GICHD and risk-management consultant Katrin 
Stauffer developed a methodology whereby instruments and tools 
could be used according to the needs of a country or area facing such 
transition. The infancy of the methodology required it to be pretested 
in a country facing this challenge as a basis for further research and 
future application.
LONG-TERM RISK MANAGEMENT 
IN VIETNAM 
Vietnam’s highly EO-contaminated provinces have been pro-
actively surveyed and cleared at different levels, and in some loca-
tions the question of transitioning to a reactive risk management 
strategy in a residual state has begun to arise. As the country is not 
a party of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) or 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), the national authority 
responsible for mine action—the Vietnam National Mine Action 
Centre (VNMAC)—is left to determine a tolerable level of risk and 
the appropriate point in time to change from a proactive survey and 
clearance to a reactive risk management strategy.3
In the framework of the MORE project, an initial methodology 
was presented by the GICHD to VNMAC and relevant stakeholders. 
It was jointly refined over an eighteen-month process, during which 
VNMAC took a leading role in determining relevant instruments and 
tools for its context. National ownership was a key principle of the 
process to ensure that the results would benefit Vietnam. This ap-
proach allowed for greater engagement of relevant parties and proved 
crucial in contributing to the sustainability of the process. 
Under VNMAC’s leadership, the province of Quảng Trị was selected 
for the pretest. It is known as the most heavily contaminated, yet one of 
the most active and well-organized provinces with regards to mine ac-
tion activities. Many of its districts have undergone survey and clear-
ance, most of the population has benefitted from explosive ordnance 
risk education (EORE) activities, and high-quality data is available. 
These optimal preconditions led to the selection of Cam Lộ and Hải 
Lăng Districts for the pretest, which was conducted in May 2019.
ASSESSING AND MANAGING RESIDUAL 
RISK: METHODS AND FINDINGS
The pretest introduced the proposed risk management instru-
ments and tools to the reality of operations in contaminated areas in 
Quảng Trị, as well as local population’s reactions and beliefs regard-
ing EO threats. Instruments and tools used in the pretest formed part 
of a holistic approach hereafter described as the long-term risk man-
agement (LTRM) framework. The robustness of the methodology— 
adapted to the local context and based on extensive research and reli-
able data—proved crucial in building a credible process.4
IDENTIFYING THE TOLERABLE 
LEVEL OF RISK
The methodology relied on indicators to recognize a residual state. 
A location has not reached a residual state until achieving a set of 
indicators (according to the predetermined tolerable level of risk as 
Long-Term Risk Management 
Tools and Protocols for Residual 
Explosive Ordnance Mitigation:
A PRETEST IN VIETNAM
by Katrin Stauffer [ RISKey GmbH ] and Christelle Mestre [ GICHD ]
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agreed upon by the relevant national authority). The methodology also 
stressed that the same indicators should be used to evaluate the risk af-
ter the residual state is achieved.5
The proposed indicators considered socioeconomic, psychological, 
and financial impacts of an EO threat. Indicators aimed to understand 
if EO threats were still causing victims (looking at the death prob-
ability rate in different ways: Indicator 1 options A, B, C1, and C2),6 
if they were still having a psychological impact on affected people (ef-
fect on well-being: Indicator 2), and if they influenced their behavior 
(land use: Indicator 3). Furthermore, it was considered if people had 
the chance to benefit from EORE activities (Indicator 4), and if the 
cost-benefit ratio of mitigating an EO threat in conjunction with the 
progression of land prices was appropriate (Indicator 5). The pretest 
examined indicators against different thresholds to evaluate which 
one would be the most reasonable option to determine the residual 
state. Dialogue with relevant stakeholders allowed the authors to re-
view the indicators and thresholds that were then used in the pretest.7 
The data used to trial indicators was collected through desk research 
using national and provincial statistics as well as field survey with the 
affected population. 
Pre-test results from Cam Lộ8 indicate that whatever threshold is 
applied, as long as option C2 from Indicator 1 is used, the district 
could be considered as having achieved a residual state. These results 
corroborate general perceptions of the surveyed population in Cam 
Lộ and are understandable as the district has been fully surveyed and 
clearance mostly completed. In all other cases (if options A, B, or C1 
of Indicator 1 are considered) in Cam Lộ, the authors recommend that 
proactive activities continue, at least to a certain extent. 
The pretest results also shed light on some indicators’ limita-
tions. Options A and B of Indicator 1 tend to be very conservative, 
demanding a zero/near zero tolerance for EO victims, which might 
not be achievable as scattered unexploded ordnance (UXO) may al-
ways cause accidents/incidents despite completed clearance to recog-
nized national or international standards. In addition, Indicator 3 on 
land use did not help evaluate a residual state in Cam Lộ. In fact, 
while respondents reported having dramatically changed their well- 
being after proactive clearance was conducted (Indicator 2) and 
highly benefitting from EORE activities (Indicator 4), they report-
ed using the land regardless of a potential EO threat and despite ef-
fects to their well-being (Indicator 3). 
The significance of these findings and decisions on which indica-
tors and thresholds to consider to determine the reasonable level of 
risk require further discussion among stakeholders. It is also sug-
gested that indicators and thresholds be reviewed and further test-
ed, sample size increased, and other areas tested (including districts 
where proactive activities are ongoing but have not been completed) 
in order to refine the LTRM framework. 
MANAGING RESIDUAL RISK
Once a residual state is achieved, mine action programs tran-
sition to a reactive risk management strategy. Residual contami-
nation poses a risk that cannot be accepted when an item of EO 
(hazard) interacts with a specific land use (activity) in a specified 
area (location). 
CAM LỘ DISTRICT
Threshold 1 Threshold 2 Threshold 3
Indicator 1, option A No residual state No residual state No residual state
Indicator 1, option B No residual state No residual state No residual state
Indicator 1, option C1 (top 20) No residual state No residual state No residual state
Indicator 1, option C2 (top 20) Residual state Residual state Residual state
Indicator 2 Residual state Residual state Residual state
Indicator 3 Residual state Residual state Residual state
Indicator 4 Residual state Residual state Residual state
Overall rating
(with option a-C2 for indicator 1) A B C1 C2 A B C1 C2 A B C1 C2
Table 1. Simplified overview of evaluation results in Cam Lộ District, per indicator/option and threshold including a proposal 
for an overall rating and related further actions.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.
LOCATION
(3D) HAZARD
ACTIVITY
Figure 1. In a reactive risk management approach, contamination 
is only addressed if the combination of the hazard, the location, 
and the activity poses a risk that is not acceptable.
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This may happen when construction work on a specific site exceeds 
the standard clearance depth or occurs on a site where no area clear-
ance has been done (e.g., outside of cluster munition footprints). To 
address this, a detailed analysis should be led and mitigating mea-
sures considered. For this purpose and as part of the LTRM frame-
work, two different forms were developed.
Form “B1” proposes to establish a general risk assessment for a spe-
cific site, in relation to a specific planned activity. It allows the sur-
vey team to determine the likelihood of encountering different types 
of ammunition (low, medium, or high according to different thresh-
olds), and indicates whether the expected residual EO threat poses a 
relevant risk to the planned activities, offering standardized follow-
up procedures. Form “B2” captures main outcomes of form B1 and 
requires a more detailed analysis of the EO threat, which is done by 
looking at the characteristics of the planned 
land use and the ammunition (type, condi-
tion, expected depth, etc.) present. It facili-
tates the comprehensive analysis of the threat 
and ensures that detailed risk mitigation 
measures are proposed.
The tools were tested on six different de-
velopment sites and proved to be useful and 
easy to use. More work and further testing 
are however needed in order to gain further 
insights in regard to the applicability of dif-
ferent thresholds and mapping methods.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND CONCLUSION
The pretest was a stepping stone in the assess-
ment of the LTRM framework’s feasibility 
and relevance in Vietnam. It confirmed that 
the overall methodology to evaluate the 
tolerable level of risk, including tools to 
manage residual risk, is applicable and 
generates informative results. It also al-
lowed the GICHD to draw important 
lessons learned for the improvement 
of the LTRM framework while demon-
strating its potential. The robustness of 
the methodology proved to be essen-
tial to build a credible process, with the 
key contribution of VNMAC demon-
strating their innovative and solution- 
oriented thinking. The technicality of 
the framework however calls for great-
er efforts to strengthen ownership over 
the LTRM concept, as it was observed 
that its purpose was not thoroughly un-
derstood by all stakeholders involved. 
As demonstrated in the pretest, the 
differentiated contamination in Vietnam prompted the need for tai-
lored instruments and tools to be adapted to the realities in the dif-
ferent provinces, under the leadership of VNMAC. The coordination 
of such efforts at the provincial level proved to be a key success factor 
for the research. For future implementation of the LTRM framework 
in other contexts, it is highly recommended that pre-existing regu-
latory frameworks—responsibilities, processes, and procedures—are 
in place. 
The pretest also demonstrated that the LTRM framework’s instru-
ments and tools rely on the availability of data. Failure to gather and 
analyze reliable data may hinder the possibility to determine whether 
a residual state has been achieved or not. Comprehensive high-quality 
data is a pre-condition for the use of the LTRM framework.
If well-coordinated and using appropriate high-quality data, the 
Figure 2. Form B1: Mapping of (residual) contamination, Northwest Hùng Vương sports  
service area, Hải Lăng Town.
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LTRM framework is paramount to 
evaluating and managing residual 
contamination, and can determine 
when and where the risk is higher. 
This framework is not time-bound, 
allowing the relevant authority to 
evaluate whether a residual state 
has been achieved at any time dur-
ing ongoing proactive survey and 
clearance (according to the pre-
determined tolerable level of risk). 
The relevant national authorities 
can create context-specific instru-
ments adapted to evaluate risk on a 
specified area, recognizing that peo-
ple’s perception, knowledge, and ap-
proach to risk vary among place and 
situation. The same extent of proac-
tive activities might not be neces-
sary in every area or district in order 
to address the residual state.
By providing the tools to eval-
uate when an area achieves a re-
sidual state and how to manage 
residual contamination response, 
the framework provides evidence 
for decision-makers that helps them 
prioritize and determine where to 
allocate resources, based on the 
agreed long-term risk management 
approach. 
See endnotes page 58
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Figure 3. Form B2: Site-specific risk assessment, Northwest Hùng Vương sports service area, 
Hải Lăng Town.
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E
fficient and effective land release is a core global priority for 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group), Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA), and The HALO Trust (HALO), as significant and on-
going investment of resources and expertise continually improve pro-
cedures and approaches. Cluster Munitions Remnants Survey: Best 
Practice in South East Asia is the result of many years of close coop-
eration between MAG, NPA, and HALO on survey and clearance of 
cluster munition remnants (CMR) in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 
Ahead of the 9th Meeting of States Party (9MSP) to the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions (CCM), held in Geneva in September 2019, op-
erational and programmatic staff from the three organizations met to 
discuss key lessons learned during twelve years of surveying cluster 
munitions in Southeast Asia. The identified lessons and agreed best 
practice were summarized in a joint publication that was also present-
ed at a side event during the 9MSP in Geneva attended by government 
delegates, national mine action authorities, international mine action 
and U.N. organizations, and civil society. The publication and side 
event were generously funded by the Government of the United States.
THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONTEXT
Within Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (hereinafter referred to as 
Southeast Asia), there is predominant, long-standing contamination 
from CMR. This contamination has some defining characteristics 
that present a specific context for operators to address. CMR found 
Cluster munitions in Laos.
All figures courtesy of NPA.
by Kim McCosker and Jan Erik Støa, edited by Katherine Harrison 
[ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
CLUSTER MUNITION 
REMNANT SURVEY 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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in Southeast Asia are typically BLU-type munitions between forty and 
sixty-five years old, with a detonation failure rate of up to 30 percent. 
Combined with the density of the bombing, this high failure rate has 
resulted in dense, surface-level contamination from aged munitions. 
The presence of munitions over many decades has also led to large 
amounts of historic data released to support clearance efforts, includ-
ing accident data, information from previous tasks, and bombing data.
This context requires an evidence-based survey response based on 
a comprehensive desk assessment to consider all available historic 
data, a thorough Non-Technical Survey (NTS) to ensure all evidence 
is identified, and a Technical Survey (TS) targeted only where actual 
evidence is identified, not feared or suspected. Combined, these steps 
are referred to as Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS).
DEVELOPMENT OF CMRS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Based on operational experience, and the shared belief that a well-
managed, locally-adapted response should be used to target survey 
and clearance of cluster munitions, MAG, NPA, and HALO have 
worked closely on the development of CMRS. 
The first cluster munition survey operations were conducted by 
NPA in Southeast Asia in 2008. Much of the thinking that informed 
the designs of earlier surveys was based on addressing landmine con-
tamination; however, lessons could be learned from cluster muni-
tion survey and clearance in Lebanon in 2006, South Sudan in 
2005, and as far back as Kosovo in the late 1990s. Risk assessments 
quickly identified that the nature of the threat was significantly dif-
ferent from landmines, most notably in that teams could freely walk 
on the ground in areas with suspected contamination from CMR. As 
such, NPA’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in Vietnam 
conducted random TS in any direction from an identified CMR as 
early as 2008 and, parallel to this, NPA’s Lao PDR programme was 
using full battle area clearance (BAC) teams to conduct similarly ran-
dom searches using CMR as a starting point. This resulted in a slow 
and unsystematic search that did not provide the accuracy required 
for effective land release. Random TS did not sufficiently capture all 
available evidence and was unable to estimate the scope of contami-
nation reliably. Clearance was still response-based, which resulted in 
huge inefficiencies in resource use as teams revisited villages multi-
ple times. The need for a systematic, evidence-based survey was clear, 
and CMRS was developed progressively through multiple stages over 
many years. Previous versions used lessons learned to incrementally 
improve the accuracy of the methodology. Progress through vari-
ous stages is detailed further in the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining’s (GICHD) study, A Study of Land Release 
in Quảng Trị Province.
Variations in country contexts and operating environments mean 
that defining a universal CMRS methodology is not possible. However, 
by recognizing what constitutes best practice, operators and other 
stakeholders can work to ensure that, where implemented, CMRS ad-
heres to an agreed set of base criteria and principles. This best practice 
is summarized in the following section.1
OVERVIEW OF BEST PRACTICES IN CMRS
CMRS is defined as the application of all reasonable effort 
through NTS and TS procedures, to identify and define a confirmed 
hazardous area (CHA) from CMR contamination. The key output of 
CMRS is a defined boundary of a CHA based on direct evidence of 
CMR contamination, which will be used to support planning for and 
prioritization of future BAC activities.
NTS is the application of all reasonable effort used to collect infor-
mation in order to identify direct evidence of contamination. NTS, 
as a part of CMRS, should always include a thorough desk assess-
ment of all available data including bombing data, historical opera-
tional, and accident data as well as any other relevant information 
(including development plans and data from commercial or military 
operators) prior to field deployment. Bombing data from the United 
States Air Force (USAF) should not be used as direct evidence due 
to the inaccuracy and methodology of recording this data; how-
ever, USAF bombing data can be used to inform operators as to the 
type and number of munitions that may be present in the area. NTS 
should be ongoing throughout the survey process, allowing teams 
to swiftly change activities depending on the situation and infor-
mation they are investigating. NTS can also be conducted alongside 
NPA personnel conducts TS. By sharing successes and challeng-
es, the CMRS process can be incrementally improved to deliver 
more accurate results and more efficient clearance operations.
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TS over a longer period of time, which allows teams to make contin-
ued, informed assessments of results. Socioeconomic and impact data 
collected throughout the CMRS process and confirmed during end-
of-survey assessments provides the necessary data to help prioritize 
CHAs during clearance. 
To ensure correct, up-to-date information is acted upon in one 
continuous process, TS should begin as soon as possible following the 
completion of NTS and should be inducted using a system of boxes 
based on a 1 km by 1 km grid map. The standard TS search box is 50 m 
by 50 m for a total of 2,500 m2, and each search box has a unique iden-
tification number. The search pattern within each box may vary, de-
pending on vegetation cover, topography, detectors being used, and 
soil mineral content; however, it should be systematic in approach 
and implemented to ensure that a minimum of 50 percent of the 
box will be covered. When the search is complete, the box is color- 
coded, based on the colors in Figure 1, to map the presence of CMR. 
If a CMR is found, the search in that box will stop, and the box will 
be marked red on the map. The team will then move on to a new des-
ignated box. 
Boxes may be “skipped” in areas of dense contamination. In some 
areas of Southeast Asia, cluster munition strikes are so dense that 
strike footprints overlap, creating CHAs that are millions of square 
meters in size. This can result in a large number of red boxes, partic-
ularly toward the center of a CHA. As such, one or more boxes can be 
Red boxes indicate a cluster munition found, yellow boxes cluster munition fragments, green boxes nothing found, blue boxes the 
presence of other ERW.
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skipped so the boundary of the CHA is iden-
tified with less survey effort inside the foot-
print. This is a significant advantage to the 
CMRS methodology that drastically reduc-
es the time and effort spent on survey inside 
contaminated areas, which require clearance 
and more accurately estimates for the amount 
of clearance required. 
CMRS should be carried out by specially-
trained or multi-skilled teams, with appro-
priate tools and experience. The teams take 
responsibility for all activities associated with 
the task of clearance, including desk assess-
ments, community liaison, TS and NTS, EOD, 
and impact assessment. The confidence and 
experience of the operational team is criti-
cal to the implementation of CMRS. A team 
leader must have the training and resources 
available to make confident decisions and rec-
ommendations at each step. 
A key element of CMRS is applying all rea-
sonable effort to gathering information on the 
presence and impact of CMR from key infor-
mants within villages. Teams should spend 
sufficient time in a village to support the devel-
opment of stronger rapport and trust between 
team and community members. This encour-
ages more open sharing of information on the 
location and impact of CMR. Teams should 
also be able to conduct demolitions, to encour-
age more active information sharing by affect-
ed community members, who will see their 
information directly informing operations. 
Ultimately, the survey and clearance of 
CMR should be based on continued threat as-
sessment, evidence-based decision-making processes, ongoing qual-
ity assurance through verification of decision making, and close 
coordination with all stakeholders. CMRS is considered complete 
when an end-of-survey report is accepted by the national mine ac-
tion authority.
 CMR CLEARANCE
CHA boundaries based on direct evidence will ultimately result 
in a better-prioritized, more-efficient clearance process. Clearance 
remains the best means of ensuring quality control of the CMRS 
process and accuracy of the CHA polygon produced. After analyz-
ing the results of clearance activities, CMRS procedures may be 
adjusted if results do not provide sufficient or accurate informa-
tion to the clearance team. The feedback loop between clearance 
and CMRS is critical to avoiding under- or over-estimating the size 
of the CHA, and to verifying the accuracy and quality of survey 
results. For this feedback loop to be effective, clearance should be 
conducted as soon as possible after CMRS.
The close operational partnership between NPA and MAG in 
Quảng Trị Province, Vietnam, is an excellent example of this best 
practice. In Quảng Trị, NPA survey teams create CHAs that are 
cleared by MAG BAC teams. MAG and NPA routinely share all op-
erational data and regularly conduct joint analysis to identify areas 
of improvement in the methodology. Through this partnership, op-
erators were able to confirm that the boundary of the CHAs pro-
duced during CMRS were accurate and could be used to inform 
planning and prioritize clearance resources.
WHAT COMES NEXT?
All three NGOs are seeking to further develop the CMRS meth-
odology by trialing changes in its implementation. Examples of 
ongoing trials include investigations into the optimal team size, 
Cooperation between all stakeholders and a transparent information management sys-
tem are essential to the availability and accessibility of information.
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utilization of new animal and mechanical detection assets, improved 
digital reporting procedures, and desktop mapping of evidence points 
to create an initial CHA boundary.
Continued collaboration, discussion, and sharing of lessons 
learned is critical to support the most effective and efficient adherence 
to CCM obligations and to increase the safety and socioeconomic de-
velopment of cluster munition-affected communities in Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam. MAG, NPA, and HALO will continue their close 
partnership in Southeast Asia and will seek to update the CMRS best 
practices document to reflect improvements to operational efficiency.
Involvement of stakeholders outside of the MAG-NPA-HALO 
partnership is of fundamental importance to the application and 
improvement of CMRS. Bringing together national and provincial 
authorities, other survey and clearance operators, and the donor 
community to discuss the best implementation of cluster munition 
survey and clearance in the region is critical for promoting its ro-
bust implementation, fostering strong national ownership, and en-
suring the continual refinement of methodologies. This was most 
recently facilitated by the Government of the United States, which 
brought seventy-one stakeholders from Southeast Asia and fur-
ther afield together in Quảng Trị Province, Vietnam, at the Second 
Regional Workshop on Cluster Munition Remnants Survey. At this 
workshop, the focus was to document best practices in CMRS in 
Southeast Asia as well as develop concrete plans of actions for each 
of the three countries. This workshop was a follow-up to the first, 
which was organized in June 2017, also funded by the Government of 
United States. Moreover, early donor support from the United States 
and Norway was key for NPA’s efforts us to be able to develop CMRS.
CMRS methodology draws from the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) and internationally agreed mine action principles 
to enable the most effective application of land release in a cluster 
munition context. However, CMRS is not currently included as a spe-
cific standard or Technical Note (TN) in IMAS and is instead covered 
under the general principles of IMAS and across several standards. 
This is primarily due to the development of IMAS being based on 
a landmine contamination context, and the significantly different 
nature of the threat being addressed in Southeast Asia. All opera-
tors work with national authorities to ensure National Mine Action 
Standards (NMAS) in Southeast Asia adhere to IMAS as closely as 
possible, and encourage NMAS to outline and define key require-
ments specific to CMRS. At the same time, MAG, NPA, and HALO 
believe that there is scope for IMAS to be revised to provide stronger 
standards for the implementation of CMRS in Southeast Asia and as 
such, a TN for mine action is being prepared to suggest revisions to 
the current IMAS, and will be submitted to the IMAS Review Board 
with a view for formal adoption. 
Finally, it is important to consider CMRS methodology in different 
and emerging contexts. There is strong indication that CMRS meth-
odology may have application in other locations with heavy clus-
ter munition contamination, including southern Iraq and southern 
Lebanon. Areas with dense, surface-level contamination from CMR 
will likely require a systematic, evidence-based survey response 
based on the identification of CHA boundaries instead of single 
items to provide a basis for informed clearance. By sharing successes 
and challenges in implementation and discussing lessons learned, 
the CMRS process has, and will continue to be, incrementally im-
proved to deliver more accurate results and provide a basis for more 
effective and efficient clearance operations. 
See endnotes page 59
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Residual risk from unexploded ordnance (UXO) is a by-product of all modern conflicts. Developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), the Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War 
(MORE) program seeks to characterize risk and carefully examine the 
factors involved in reducing long-term risks from munitions.1 MORE 
looks at many factors, including the impacts of time on munitions, 
explosives, and fuzing systems. Other critical considerations are the 
resources available to manage residual UXO and best practices from 
former conflict areas used to successfully overcome the risk reduction 
challenges. In Vietnam, the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation 
(Golden West) conducts a program training the Vietnamese 
Provincial Military Command (PMC) to conduct explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) to international standards with the goal of building 
long-term capacity.
One constant of modern conflict is that explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) are pervasive and enduring. World War I-era ERW is recov-
ered daily from the fields of Belgium and France. World War II-era 
bombs still shake London decades after the Blitz ended. Golden West 
and others still recover United States and Japanese bombs from Pacific 
Islands more than 70 years after the war ended.
Conflict in Vietnam ended in 1979, but the impact of years of war 
remain. The international community has worked hard to conduct 
clearance of ERW, but long-term risk in Vietnam is a reality. Despite 
the Quảng Trị provincial goal of clearing all priority UXO sites by 
2025,2 UXO will exist in Vietnam for a very long time. While the fre-
quency of UXO reporting will likely decrease as time passes, building 
a permanent capability to quickly and safely respond to these reports 
is critical to future public safety.
One important component of the MORE program is a long-term ag-
ing study of munitions that looks at how time impacts risk via the deg-
radation of explosives, propellants, and fuzes.3 Recently, Golden West 
worked with Vietnamese provincial officials (including the Quảng Trị 
Provincial Military Command), the Vietnam National Mine Action 
Centre (VNMAC), GICHD, and FENIX Insight Ltd., to conduct anal-
ysis of munitions collected in Quảng Trị Province. Golden West facili-
tated cutting of the munitions, enabling detailed analysis by experts 
from FENIX Insight Ltd. and Vietnam’s Institute of Propellants and 
Explosives in Hanoi.
As noted by GICHD’s MORE program, proactive ERW clearance 
(large-scale survey and clearance) eventually gives way to a reactive 
process involving responses to individual incidents. Post-conflict re-
sponses by the international community provide significant capabil-
ity during the proactive phase of ERW remediation. Once an active 
transition to a reactive phase begins, clearance opportunities begin 
to fall off, numbers reflecting land cleared and UXO recovered plum-
met, and donor interest inevitably evaporates. When this happens, 
Providing IMAS Training to 
Local Military Forces and 
Mitigating Long-Term ERW 
Risks in VIETNAM
by Allan Vosburgh [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
Quảng Trị PMC EOD Operations Center.
All images courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.
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large foreign-funded clearance organizations may become economical-
ly unsustainable and ERW infrastructure must be reduced. According 
to the GICHD, this reduction has been in proportion to the residual 
risk remaining, and the challenge is to provide a proportional response. 
National capacity has to be sustainable, and building capability with the 
PMC local forces is one possible solution to that challenge.
During the transitional period, risk to the populace remains high, 
but national level assets to respond to this risk are limited. Having 
international support available made it possible for the Ministry of 
National Defense and VNMAC to address other priorities and de-
lay the development of national-level UXO programs. The abili-
ty to generate the skills necessary to provide EOD response teams 
at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels is essential. 
Community outreach is best done by the provinces and conducted 
by the enduring local forces who are an integral part of the provin-
cial community.
Golden West concentrates on building capacity in order to enable 
enduring Vietnamese institutions to accept the challenge of transi-
tioning from proactive to reactive responses (as predicted by MORE). 
With support from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
(PM/WRA), Golden West promotes training to internation-
al standards and contributes technologies that are appropriate for 
Vietnamese requirements.4 Our partners in this effort are the Quảng 
Trị Provincial People’s Committee, Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DOFA), the Quảng Trị Mine Action Centre (QTMAC), and the 
Quảng Trị PMC. All of these enduring institutions have worked 
hard and shown exceptional vision and confidence to make the PMC 
EOD program in Quảng Trị a success and a potential model for other 
provinces in Vietnam.
The PMC of Quảng Trị is a key partner in this program. Responsive 
to provincial leaders for defense, disaster assistance, and economic 
development, the PMC is also an important element of the People’s 
Army of Vietnam. In this role, the PMC is a component of Vietnam’s 
4th Military Regional Headquarters in Vinh.5 PMC EOD teams are 
an intrinsic part of their communities, playing a major role in disas-
ter relief during flooding and major storm events. Relations with the 
community are strong and we have witnessed many instances where 
local residents approach PMC EOD teams during an incident, report-
ing additional, previously unknown UXO.
When Golden West first engaged Quảng Trị’s PMC, their teams 
were unorganized, under-utilized, poorly-equipped, had no reliable 
dedicated transportation, and had ineffective field medical support. 
Most of all, the PMC was not often tasked by QTMAC or the pro-
vincial authorities because they were perceived as not being as well 
trained, equipped, or available for responses as the international 
HMA organizations working in the province. That perception has 
undergone a marked change since 2016 when Golden West first part-
nered with the PMC.
Golden West provides IMAS EOD Level 1–3 training for Quang 
Tri’s PMC. The program goals are to substantially improve PMC 
EOD technical skills, improve documentation of UXO recovered, 
destroyed, and reported to QTMAC, improve detection training and 
tools, better field medical support to PMC EOD forces, and improve 
PMC's relationships with both QTMAC and other international non-
government organizations (INGOs) working in Quảng Trị Province. 
Since the project began, Golden West has trained fifty-three EOD 
personnel: thirty-seven IMAS EOD Level 1 technicians, as well as 
eleven IMAS EOD Level 2 and five IMAS EOD Level 3 supervisors. 
Not all of these operators are still on the team, because some have 
been transferred to the QTMAC to conduct important quality con-
trol functions. By the end of 2019, Golden West plans to conduct 
an additional two classes of ten district-level PMC personnel for 
an IMAS Level 1-based munitions identification class for a total of 
twenty students. These additional personnel will enable PMC engi-
neers in the districts to provide better UXO reporting to the PMC 
EOD team, making inputs to the QTMAC and tasking of EOD re-
sponses more effective. Golden West also plans to conduct an IMAS 
EOD Level 3 class in Quảng Trị Province before the end of 2019. This 
will be the first IMAS EOD Level 3 training conducted in Vietnam.
Quảng Trị PMC EOD response vehicle.
Quảng Trị PMC EOD ammunition storage container.
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PMC EOD range at Cam Lo.
M117 bomb incident.
The PMC has fully embraced IMAS-based EOD training in Quảng 
Trị Province. Golden West maintains high standards for all its train-
ing and achieving certification is not easy. In addition to three weeks 
of formal training that incorporates both classroom instruction and 
practical field exercises, Golden West requires a mentoring period pri-
or to certification. During mentoring, which can last up to one year, 
experienced technical advisors (TAs) observe students in the field 
during actual EOD incidents, reinforcing their skills and ensuring 
application of their IMAS training. During mentoring, TAs provide 
continuing sustainment training and conduct ad hoc classes on recov-
ered munitions. Golden West also encourages PMC leaders to conduct 
their own classes, gaining experience conducting training and provid-
ing sustainable, formal instruction skills.
Golden West has worked hard to improve the PMC’s capacity to 
conduct high-quality detection operations. In addition to providing 
the PMC’s EOD teams with modern detection equipment, Golden 
West’s Ph.D. geophysicist helped construct a small test and calibra-
tion area to ensure those detectors are operating properly. Through 
these efforts, the Quảng Trị PMC has become highly skilled in the use 
of detection equipment employed during emergency responses and 
battle area clearances.
The PMCs needed help improving field medical capabilities for 
their EOD Teams. With PM/WRA support, Golden West provided 
all new field medical kits for the medics supporting PMC EOD teams 
and arranged for training for their field medical personnel, stressing 
urgent treatment for injuries related to UXO operations. PMC EOD 
personnel also receive “field medical” classes as part of their regular 
sustainment training. Golden West attempts to leverage other outside 
medical experts at every opportunity to enhance the skills of PMC 
field medics. These include training by the Vietnamese Red Cross 
and opportunities for training by U.S. military medics as part of the 
Department of Defense’s HMA cooperation with VNMAC.
QTMAC has evolved in coordination with the Provincial People’s 
Committee. Unlike neighboring provinces where the PMCs manage 
UXO responses without a dedicated mine action center, QTMAC co-
ordinates all emergency responses or requests for EOD support from 
the Quảng Trị community. The volume of QTMAC tasks for PMC 
responses has increased dramatically as PMC capabilities improve. 
Since the start of 2019, PMC EOD teams have responded to over 400 
emergency response requests from QTMAC.
Quảng Trị’s PMC EOD Program has changed substantially since 
beginning work with Golden West in 2016. When Golden West first 
engaged the Quảng Trị PMC, they were organized much like all the 
other fifty-eight provinces in Vietnam with PMCs.6 The experienced 
EOD technicians were scattered among the ten district-level areas, and 
each was responsible for conducting ERW operations in their assigned 
areas, often using untrained military personnel borrowed from PMC 
engineers. Insufficient training, equipment, field medical support, and 
dedicated transportation limited their value to the QTMAC. Largely 
due to a lack of confidence in PMC skills and capability to respond, the 
QTMAC did not often call on them for EOD support.
Golden West encouraged the PMC to appeal to Vietnam's 4th 
Military Region Headquarters in Vinh, requesting a change in how 
their EOD personnel were organized; this resulted in the creation of 
a standing, five-person EOD team (four IMAS-qualified EOD oper-
ators and one field medic), available for emergency response twen-
ty-four hours a day. Vietnam's 4th Military Region Headquarters 
approved this change at the end of 2018.
The first test of the new concept occurred over the 2018–2019 
Christmas and Tết (Vietnamese New Year) holiday periods, when 
other INGO teams are unavailable for response. The QTMAC was 
concerned that there would be no emergency response capabil-
ity for the province during these periods, but Lieutenant Colonel 
Hung, Quang Tri’s PMC Engineer Commander, and his EOD teams 
stepped up and provided full-time EOD coverage. Not only was the 
PMC able to respond to multiple emergency incidents, but they were 
able to reduce their overall response time to twelve hours from the 
previous standard of twenty-four hours.
The PMC EOD response team obtained a building on a PMC in-
stallation in Đông Hà and, with Golden West help, refurbished it 
as an EOD team headquarters and operations center. Housing the 
response team 24/7 during their tour of duty and securing the 
team’s response equipment, this building has telephone utilities and 
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internet service, and is linked to the QTMAC, enabling short notice 
responses and much improved incident reporting.
A major shortfall preventing effective PMC EOD responses has 
been a lack of permanently assigned vehicles for use during opera-
tions. Late in 2018, Golden West leased a dedicated EOD response ve-
hicle for the PMC, and the teams use it regularly, responding to more 
than forty emergency responses per month, most of these tasked by 
the QTMAC. Additionally, PMC leadership provided the PMC EOD 
organization a five-ton truck. Quảng Trị's DOFA also recently pro-
vided another EOD response vehicle to keep the response teams mo-
bile when the leased vehicle is no longer available.
Golden West was concerned that UXO collected by the PMC EOD 
team was being stored dangerously close to the EOD operations cen-
ter. Golden West also found that the EOD team’s working explosives 
were stored in an inhabited building on a PMC installation. With 
Golden West assistance, the PMC obtained improved UXO and ex-
plosives storage, increasing safety and reducing the risk of theft or ex-
plosive accidents. Risk mitigating storage is also being established at 
the PMC’s new Cam LỘ range. This storage consists of modified ship-
ping containers, properly sited on concrete pads and secured to safely 
store recovered UXO until it can be destroyed.
This year, the PMC was assigned a permanent 400-acre range lo-
cated in Cam LỘ District,7 with part of it dedicated to EOD training 
and demilitarization. The PMC requested Golden West assistance 
to help make this range into a training and demilitarization facility. 
In addition to assisting with basic infrastructure and explosive stor-
age, Golden West is helping to build specialized demolition pits for 
phosphorus-filled munitions and recommending construction of 
detection training and test lanes to foster more technical detec-
tion expertise.8
Golden West’s project with Quảng Trị’s PMC is designed to make 
PMC EOD teams self-sufficient and capable of accepting the chal-
lenge of long-term ERW risk management. Enhanced PMC skills give 
provincial officials more confidence in PMC capabilities so they pro-
vide better support and equipment to the PMC, making them even 
more capable. Integration of Golden West’s train-the-trainer and 
mentoring approach provides a means for the PMC to continue devel-
oping IMAS-qualified EOD operators long after Golden West’s U.S. 
Department of State-funded project is complete.
As articulated by the GICHD, the important elements of managing 
residual ERW risk include the development of indigenous capacities 
and capabilities. The availability of EOD skills, assets, and the scale 
of that availability are key parts of the MORE context. Some MORE 
risk controls rely heavily upon the availability of suitably-skilled 
EOD response assets in sufficient quantities. As the implementers 
of IMAS-based EOD capacity building programs for the Quảng Trị 
PMC, Golden West is helping to make MORE a reality in Quảng Trị 
Province by increasing those EOD capacities and capabilities and as-
sisting the PMC with building a future workforce that will be ready 
to assume the challenges of mitigating the long-term risks of resid-
ual ERW.
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Vietnam’s long journey to recovery from decades of war must fo-
cus on finding a local solution to the long-term residual risks of UXO 
and other ERW. Our colleagues in Quảng Trị Province recognize that 
the problems of managing long-term risk are theirs to solve. They 
know that the international presence, available to respond to indi-
vidual UXO incidents, cannot be sustained forever. In response, pro-
vincial authorities have stepped up their efforts to find meaningful 
solutions to these challenges. The PMC’s EOD forces are an intrinsic 
component of the province’s defense planning. They are a national as-
set and an important part of the People’s Army for national level de-
fense, but they also respond to the provincial government and assist 
in solving provincial challenges.
This model seems to have value when we look at other nations with 
comparable ERW challenges. Golden West’s training program is not 
an immediate solution, but does create a path to future capabilities. 
The difficult technical skills required to safely and effectively respond 
to a wide range of EOD challenges are not created overnight. The 
costs to build these skills are substantial, but not when considered 
in light of the overall costs to maintain a large international effort. 
Investing in a future capability for self-help and national manage-
ment of an ERW program seems to make sense when viewed as part 
of a continuum, with acute, large-scale requirements for urgent clear-
ance of battle areas on one end, and the chronic, regular discovery of 
residual ERW on the other. It is up to national authorities to deter-
mine what mix of civilian, NGO, contractor, and military support 
works best for their situation. Vietnam has been moving in a positive 
direction for a number of years and has made great progress in re-
ducing deaths and injuries from ERW. They seem to be poised on the 
edge of the transition from proactive clearances to reactive respons-
es. Golden West believes the international community would do well 
to promote this effort to provide Vietnam with professional, highly-
qualified EOD forces for future requirements. Quảng Trị Province is 
showing the rest of Vietnam a way to move ahead and prepare for the 
future. Whether the rest of Vietnam’s provinces will follow their ex-
ample remains to be seen. 
See endnotes page 59
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More than forty years after the war, Vietnam remains high-ly contaminated with 800,000 tons1 of landmines and un-exploded ordnance (UXO) such as artillery shells, bombs, 
missiles, and mortars contaminating 6.1 million hectares of land. 
According to the Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, landmines 
and UXO were the cause of 129 deaths and 241 injuries between 2008 
and 2017.2 Survey findings show that children are one of the most 
high-risk groups in many provinces in Vietnam, including in heavily- 
affected provinces such as Quảng Trị, Quảng Bình, Bình Ðinh, and 
Quảng Nam.3 Since the end of the war, children have been dispropor-
tionately affected by mine and UXO-related accidents, of which 38 
percent resulted from children playing with mines and UXO—main-
ly small bombs and M-79 munitions3 that they did not realize were 
dangerous. In 2015, a Catholic Relief Services (CRS) survey of 1,836 
post-war landmine survivors found that 16 percent experienced ac-
cidents between the ages of six and ten (primary-school age) and 18 
percent experienced accidents when they were aged eleven to four-
teen (secondary-school age).4 Though the Vietnam government and 
international organizations have made efforts to reduce the amount 
of contaminated land, it is likely that several decades-worth of 
work5 are necessary to completely clear the land and water during 
which time children and youth will still be at risk. Although mine 
risk education (MRE) has been taught in primary schools for years, 
lessons are not standardized and are often only included as part of 
other lessons or extracurricular activities. Without frequent and in-
depth lessons and discussions on MRE, many students’ knowledge 
of the risks of mines remains dangerously insufficient. 
DESIGN STRATEGY
To address these inconsistencies, CRS Vietnam, with fund-
ing from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the 
U.S. State Department’s Bureau for Political-Military Affairs (PM/
WRA), developed a digital game-based learning application for chil-
dren ages eight-to-twelve years old. The application includes thirty 
minutes of narrated, media-rich gaming that can run on Android, 
iOS, Windows, and Mac operating systems. The app has features in 
both Vietnamese and English and can be downloaded for free from 
Google Play and Apple. It is also designed to be easily shared, and 
by Ta Thi Hai Yen [ Catholic Relief Services Vietnam ]
Game-Based Learning: 
Figure 1. Screenshot of start page of MRE app.
All images courtesy of CRS.
AN INNOVATIVE AND SCALABLE 
APPROACH TO MINE RISK EDUCATION
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users are encouraged to share this app via emails and messages by ei-
ther clicking the sharing icon in the app’s main lesson or simply re-
sponding to the sharing reminder that pops up while playing. The app 
has both online and offline functionality and is designed to be user-
friendly and age-appropriate for both boys and girls in the Vietnam 
cultural context. 
The five stages of the app are equivalent to lessons. These lessons 
cover important MRE topics: the characteristics of landmines and 
UXO, risky behaviors that lead to accidents, ways to prevent accidents, 
consequences of accidents, and clues to identify contaminated areas. 
Key messages for each lesson are supported by eye-catching illustra-
tions and lively sounds to keep players excited and interested. Each 
stage ends with a challenge, which is a test to measure players’ knowl-
edge when they complete each stage. After completing all five stages, 
players are given one last challenge to test their overall knowledge.
This app provides a platform to provide children with standard-
ized quality MRE that they can access frequently. By playing this 
game, children can practice behaviors and thought processes in a 
simulated environment that have real-life applications. In addition to 
dynamically engaging young learners, it also facilitates learning for 
educators and adults as well. 
Another key feature of this app is a back-end system to track ba-
sic demographic details about users as well as their performance and 
progress through the five stages. Basic information on users’ char-
acter name, sex, age, and province is collected at the users’ discre-
tion, ensuring that users’ full identities are protected. Information 
gathered about users’ countries through their internet protocol (IP) 
address revealed that this game is used outside of Vietnam as well, 
indicating that the app is not only of interest to children in Vietnam 
but is also of interest to people in other countries. Figure 2 features 
a screenshot of visualized information created from data collect-
ed through the back-end system. This system plays a critical role in 
determining areas where children struggle with specific questions, 
which allows educators to better tailor in-class MRE lessons.
LAUNCHING THE MRE APP
The MRE app was officially launched in early December 2018 in 
the coastal province of Quảng Trị in central Vietnam. To an audi-
ence of hundreds of students, parents, teachers, government offi-
cials, and various mine action groups, CRS and its local government 
partners announced that the MRE app would be integrated into the 
informatics lessons of primary schools in the province.6 
In January 2019, the app was piloted in twenty-six primary schools 
across three central provinces of Vietnam: Quảng Trị, Quảng Nam, 
and Da Nang. Forty-seven school managers and information tech-
nology teachers were trained on installing and managing the app 
and given detailed instructions on its contents and structure. 
Following the training, the app was integrated into each school’s in-
formatics lessons so students could play whenever they went to the 
school computer lab. Provincial-level Department of Education and 
Training officials (DOETs) aimed for at least one-hundred students 
per school to play the game during informatics classes. 
To encourage students to use the app on their parents’ mobile 
devices, parents were introduced to the app at the end-of-the-year 
school meetings in May 2019 with the idea that students could con-
tinue to play the game throughout the summer break. This provided 
an opportunity to reinforce students’ MRE knowledge and encour-
age safe behaviors throughout the year. 
In its first six months of operation, from January to June 2019, 
the app had a total of 5,610 downloads, and users played the game 
31,717 times. CRS expects that the number of people exposed to the Table 1. Test result statistics.
Report Period: 01-2019 to 06-2019
Total users 5,610
Total sessions 31,717
Average time to complete 5 lessons 00:12:56
Average time to obtain certificate 00:22:19
Completion ratio 78%
Number of certificates issued 2,176
Total Users
Total Sessions
New Users
Number Sessions
# Lesson 1 Start
# Test 5 Complete
# Start Each Lesson
# Complete Each Lesson
# Users Start Lesson 1
5,621
5,734
31,890
30,484
12,497
70,998
2,386
47,603
9,741
Performance overview
Report Period: 01-2019 to 06-2019
Report Period: 01-2019 to 06-2019 All time
Report Period: 01-2019 to 06-2019
Test result statistics Average lesson
duration
Top 10 fastest
completion
Test
name
#
Correct
#
Wrong
#
Partial
Rank User
Average (hh:mm:ss) Duration
(hh:mm:ss)
%
co
Test
1
Test
2
Test
3
Test
4
Test
5
38,048
46,328
29,119
53,594
37,004
49,422
4,573
18,937
33,243
3,554
11,682
6,495
0
0
3,522
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
7
00:07:10
00:02:57
00:05:37
00:03:44
00:02:14
00:36:56
Anh Thu
Phúc
Duc
Lê Thiị
Tường Vy
Gia Bảo
Tuan
6
Tú
00:13:04
00:13:43
00:13:56
00:14:00
00:14:16
00:14:51
00:14:53
Lesson
Figure 2. Information created from data collected through the back-end system.
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app’s content is much higher than the number of downloads (total us-
ers) because students typically play together under one user profile at 
school, and usually play with their parents or siblings at home. 
While the app provides comprehensive MRE information, it was 
also designed to accommodate a wide range of student abilities and 
ages. On average, most users complete all five lessons in thirteen min-
utes and need another ten minutes to conquer the final challenge cov-
ering content from all the individual lessons and receive an MRE 
certificate. As of June 2019, 78 percent of the users were able to com-
plete the whole game.
Already, feedback and results have been extremely positive with 
students indicating that they really enjoy the game and Vietnamese 
provincial-level government partners expressing serious commit-
ment to ensuring schools in their jurisdiction use this app. The MRE 
app, by nature of the platforms on which it is available, is accessible 
to students throughout Vietnam. Downloads and use have expanded 
to provinces where CRS is not directly implementing MRE programs. 
Through the Landmine Working Group of Vietnam, CRS has been 
able to share key analytics on the usage of the app with other part-
ners and create a platform to discuss critical gaps in MRE knowledge 
and establish key MRE messages to disseminate across the country. 
IMPACT AND SCALABILITY
Delivering key MRE messages in the format of a game helps to 
keep children interested and to remember the messages longer. 
Since the deployment of the app, CRS’ work exposed 296,230 pri-
mary school children to MRE, and in the CRS-supported prov-
inces—Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, Quảng Nam, and Da Nang—there 
have been zero casualties. 
Students are eager to try the app at the launch.
In the pilot phase, CRS has taken to heart the feedback provid-
ed by the government and other key stakeholders. To date, most 
of it has been positive. A back-end system captures users’ perfor-
mances (lessons they fail, lessons they pass, etc.), indicating gaps 
in children’s knowledge and allowing CRS a means of adjusting 
the focus/program. 
 A government partner, Md Nguyen Thi Thuy Thuy, Vice 
Director of DOET in Quang Tri asserted that “It’s critical to pro-
vide mine risk education for students to prevent accidents. We 
appreciate this MRE Play app developed by CRS, as it’s a new edu-
cation tool, which is suitable and appealing to students. It will help 
them remember information.”
Mr. Dinh Bat Chuyen, DOET Representative in Da Nang stat-
ed that “This is a good initiative to support MRE at schools. Our 
teachers and students are very eager with learning new things, es-
pecially technologies. This kind of educational game should be 
introduced to parents as a communication channel to remind stu-
dents and their family members o[f] MRE messages and prevent 
UXO accidents in communities.”
A fifth-grade student at Cam Lo primary school, Quang Tri 
Province shared “I like the app very much. It’s very interesting to 
learn MRE through a game.” 
A teacher who has taught MRE for fifth-grade students for six 
years at Cam Lộ primary school, Quảng Trị province said that 
“The app is very useful and highly scalable. I believe that it will 
be widely used by both students and their parents.” All thirty-six 
students in her class have used the app in the school computer lab.
Globally, CRS is highlighting development of the app and 
raising visibility around using information communication 
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technology for knowledge sharing. The Vietnam team hosted 
an internal webinar on 13 December 2018 to educate other CRS 
stakeholders on the process, cost, intended uses of the app, and 
the data generated from its use. Furthermore, the app was wide-
ly shared through a forty-minute session and at the CRS booth at 
the Information and Communication Technology for Development 
(ICT4D) conference7 in Uganda on 1 May 2019. 
The app will strongly complement CRS’s class-based MRE but 
cannot completely replace it in the near future. However, if unable 
to do class-based MRE when expanding to new project provinces, 
CRS will use the app as an alternative. As the app is in the form of 
a game, project staff do not expect major challenges while being 
played by children in non-project areas. However, CRS will need 
the acceptance of the local governments of new provinces in order 
to integrate the app into lessons. Furthermore, as CRS cannot pay 
to advertise the game in app stores, many people do not know that 
the app exists. For the future, project staff may consider developing 
a second version of the game by increasing its complexity to appeal 
to an expanded range of user ages. 
See endnotes page 59
Visitors try the MRE app at the CRS booth at the Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D) conference in 
Uganda.
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Vientiane
LAOS
Prioritization of clearance activities continues to be a central issue in the unex-ploded ordnance (UXO) sector in Laos. Although the government set a policy on prioritization, it has not functioned well as a guide for operators to priori-
tize their tasks. The majority of operators tended to prioritize their operations based on 
their past experiences. This has resulted in uncertainty about how to prioritize clearance 
operations and has led to a strong demand from stakeholders for greater transparency. 
UXO Lao, the national clearance operator, has implemented a trial to introduce a clear 
planning and prioritization process for operations in order to increase transparency 
and accountability. This article explains how the Laos National Unexploded Ordnance 
Programme (UXO Lao) identified issues with the planning and prioritization process, 
and how UXO Lao has improved upon them.
Because UXO contamination is widespread across the country, the Lao government 
stresses the importance of prioritizing clearance tasks as a requirement for effectively 
reducing UXO risk. The government policy provides a basic concept of prioritization 
that requires operators to focus on heavily-contaminated areas, the government’s focal 
development areas, and poverty areas.
However, the concept does not include detailed guidance about how to apply it to-
ward making an operational annual work plan that requires prioritization of clearance 
tasks. Consequently, operators have made their own annual work plans by prioritizing 
tasks as they saw fit. UXO Lao was no exception. The UXO Lao annual work plan has 
been a consolidation of annual work plans that provincial offices have made in their 
own ways. Whereas provincial offices obtain approval from UXO Lao headquarters as 
a formality, headquarters has had little control over the process or the final product of 
these annual work plans. Additionally—again as a formality—UXO Lao headquarters 
Improving the 
Prioritization Process of
   UXO Lao
by Hayashi Ontoku Akihito
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will hold meetings and notify provincial offices when the work-plan 
making process is to start and when the plan needs to be submitted.
Stakeholders, especially donors, saw this as a problem. There has 
been no uniform process or method for prioritization across nation-
al operators or provincial offices. Transparency and accountability 
has had limited effect on making annual work plans and prioritiz-
ing tasks. Outsiders found the entire process cryptic and would doubt 
whether planning had been undertaken appropriately.
There has been another driver for UXO Lao to improve the plan-
ning process. UXO Lao has been trying to change its operation from 
a request-based approach to an evidence-based approach. In past op-
erations, UXO Lao cleared land based on requests received from vil-
lagers. This became an issue because villagers sometimes requested 
clearance in plots of land where there was little evidence of UXO. In 
such cases, UXO Lao found few items of UXO. This approach was 
frequently taken up as problematic in sector meetings. Subsequently, 
a new concept of operations, “evidence-based approach,” was intro-
duced. This approach focuses only on clearance of confirmed haz-
ardous areas (CHAs) that survey teams have identified as hazardous 
after completing technical survey. This change required UXO Lao to 
revisit its planning process to incorporate the prioritization of CHAs 
as a new step.
UXO Lao recognized the need to make the planning process 
more transparent and accountable, and to include the new concept 
of operations. Following this, UXO Lao, with Japan International 
Cooperation Agency’s (JICA’s) support, started a project to modify 
the planning process in 2015. The project aimed at setting up an ac-
countable planning process and defining criteria to prioritize tasks 
by developing guidelines that all provincial offices could follow.
UXO Lao implemented the three-year project in three southern 
provinces: Champasack, Salavan, and Xekong. For the first year, proj-
ect members at UXO Lao headquarters had a series of discussions 
with the three provincial offices to identify similarities and differenc-
es in planning processes among the offices, and from this, outlined a 
new process that reflected the common elements among the different 
planning processes. In the second year, the Champasack provincial 
office tested the new planning process while drafting an annual work 
plan and reported back to the project members about what worked 
and what didn’t. The project members were able to consolidate these 
suggestions and revise the draft process. In the third year, all three 
provincial offices tested the revised planning process. With findings 
from the trial, the project team developed a final version of the draft 
planning process at the end of the project.
There are two key features in the newly-established planning 
process: a well-defined planning cycle (Figure 1) and clarified cri-
teria for prioritizing clearance (Figure 2). Previously, field staff had 
a limited understanding of the planning cycle, which was not clear-
ly defined. The new planning process clarified the responsibilities 
of each staff member, types of actions, and timing of actions. As 
survey teams identify new CHAs and collect CHA-relevant infor-
mation throughout the year, they also visit field sites and local au-
thorities to update information on existing CHAs that have not 
been cleared. Meanwhile, managing staff prepare a list that in-
cludes information on both existing and new CHAs. Next, staff 
prioritize these CHAs based on a list of criteria and draft an annual 
work plan for the provincial office. Once local authorities receive 
this draft for consultation and approval, the draft goes to UXO Lao 
headquarters for final approval.
Figure 1. Process of making an annual work plan.
All figures courtesy of the author.
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In past operations, the provincial offices prioritized CHA-clearance 
activities based on their own criteria. In order for all the provincial 
staff members to follow uniform criteria, the new process clarifies 
the prioritization mechanism by detailing criteria and setting steps 
to apply them. The first step is to eliminate CHAs for which basic in-
formation such as landowners’ names and number of beneficiaries 
is missing. This arises when field staff members are unable to collect 
key information from landowners, either because the whereabouts of 
landowners is unknown or they live far from the site. In such cases, 
field staff continue to work on collecting the information for the next 
year’s annual work plan.
The second step is to further narrow down the CHA list using nec-
essary conditions. If CHAs fail to meet any one of the necessary con-
ditions, staff exclude the CHAs from the list and categorizes them as 
low priority. Necessary conditions include the existence of a land-use 
plan, landowners’ consent, accessibility, vegetation cutting, and data 
collection. Staff review the excluded CHAs again the following year 
with updated information. The third step employs sufficient condi-
tions as a screening function to select appropriate CHAs from the list. 
Sufficient conditions require the UXO Lao staff to check, for example, 
whether a CHA belongs to a poor village, a poor family, or other cri-
teria. Unlike necessary conditions, sufficient conditions are applied to 
each CHA one by one. CHAs that meet the first sufficient condition 
are categorized as high priority and are included in the annual work 
plan. Subsequently, the remaining CHAs that fail to meet the first con-
dition are reviewed, and CHAs that clear the second condition are put 
Hayashi Ontoku Akihito
Hayashi Ontoku Akihito is a former JICA 
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into the plan. This process is repeated until the total area of CHAs 
reaches the clearance capacity of each provincial office. These condi-
tions permit staff to filter through and prioritize CHAs from the list.
UXO Lao’s efforts have resulted in the successful implementa-
tion of an improved and more transparent trial planning process 
for CHA clearance. The new process gives stakeholders confidence 
that activities are properly managed. However, there is still scope 
to improve the planning process, and it will be tested in six other 
provinces where UXO Lao is operational to ensure that the criteria 
for CHA prioritization can accommodate different environments 
and practices. 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do 
not necessarily reflect those of UXO Lao.
Figure 2. Prioritization of CHAs.
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Integrating Survivors into a Broader Victim 
Assistance System
During the Vietnam War, an estimated 580,000 bombing missions were carried out over Laos, dropping two mil-lion tons of ordnance across the country.1 This contami-
nated Laos with approximately eighty million items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO),2 including "big bombs," cluster munition and sub-
munition bomblets, grenades, rockets, and other types of ammuni-
tion.3 There also remain an unknown number of landmines across 
the country, which are further remnants of the war. Today, fifteen out 
of eighteen provinces and approximately 25 percent of villages are 
still affected.4 Between 1964 and 2017, 50,754 people were killed or 
injured as a result of UXO and/or landmine accidents.5 While some 
landmines and UXO have been cleared, the task of demining the en-
tire country will take considerable time and, though decreasing in 
number, injuries and deaths continue to occur. In response to these 
challenges, Laos ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 
in March 2009, and the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in September 2009.6 Additionally, 
in 2012 Laos launched a National Strategic Plan for the UXO sector 
and has committed to reducing the risk of UXO by 2030 through 
Laos' national Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 18: Lives Safe 
from UXO. SDG 18 not only provides targets for clearance activi-
ties, but also addresses the ongoing needs of survivors and victims.7
The following case study draws from interviews with several UXO and landmine survivors that USAID Okard is working 
with and illustrates the challenges faced by someone living in an area contaminated with landmines and/or UXO.
Maikorly is a twenty-eight-year-old Hmong woman who is married and has three children. She lives in 
Kham District, Xieng Khouang Province. One day while she was making a fire in her kitchen, a buried bomb 
exploded, and shrapnel injured her left leg and burned her neck and face. Her family immediately took her to 
the provincial hospital, but the accident resulted in the loss of her leg and eyesight.
After two months, she was able to return home, but her life had changed dramatically; she experienced 
significant difficulty moving around her home and was forced to crawl on the dirt floor. The structure of her 
house, combined with her limited mobility and visual impairments, restricts her ability to carry out normal 
household tasks. Before her accident, she would collect firewood, go to the market, cook, clean, and care for her 
children, but now she depends on her husband to do these tasks. Fortunately, her ongoing medical expenses 
related to the UXO accident are covered by the War Victims Medical Fund (supported by the U.S. Government). 
However, due to her injuries, Maikorly can no longer work and her husband’s income alone is not enough to 
cover household expenses, putting her family at greater risk of poverty. In addition to financial strain, the ac-
cident negatively impacted the family dynamics. Her husband does not believe household tasks are “men’s 
work,” and he has begun to blame and resent Maikorly for not contributing in the way that she once could. 
Curiosity from the community about her change in appearance has also become a challenge, and Maikorly 
has faced negative reactions from some of her neighbors who believe that the accident was a result of her fam-
ily’s transgressions. Maikorly’s children have experienced bullying from classmates about their mother’s dis-
ability, and one of the children has stopped attending school as a result. 
Difficulties in functioning, shifting household roles, and stigma from the community have all contributed 
to Maikorly’s feelings of powerlessness, shame, and sadness, which has led her to become withdrawn and, at 
times, contemplate suicide. 
by Bernard Franck, Donna Koolmees, and Sarah French [ USAID Okard, World Education, Inc. ] 
COMMUNITY-BASED 
INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT:
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Integrated Victim Assistance within 
Community-Based Inclusive Development 
(CBID) Demonstration Model
Across Laos, UXO and landmines hidden in the soil cause about 
forty accidents per year,8 often leaving survivors with chronic inju-
ries. There is also an increasing prevalence of non-communicable dis-
eases, road-traffic accidents, and other health conditions that lead to 
disability and difficulties in functioning. The result is a growing need 
for increased rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and socioeconomic 
assistance for the survivors of these accidents and health conditions.
Through the USAID Okard Activity, jointly funded by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Leahy War 
Victims Fund and Victims of Torture Program, and the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State's 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), World Education, 
Inc. (WEI) partners with the Lao government and civil-society orga-
nizations (CSOs) to develop and implement disability-inclusive poli-
cies so that no one is left behind. One of the main features of USAID 
Okard Activity is the Community-Based Inclusive Development 
(CBID) Demonstration Model. 
In response to the CCM’s call “to adequately provide age and gen-
der sensitive assistance including medical care, rehabilitation, psy-
chological support, and support for social and economic inclusion” 
to survivors of UXO and landmine accidents and their commu-
nities,9 USAID Okard recognizes that in order to provide tangible 
and sustainable support, an integrated approach through a broad-
er Disability Inclusive Development (DID) framework is essential. 
The CBID Demonstration Model, developed by USAID Okard, tar-
gets any person with a disability regardless of the cause and is inclu-
sive of UXO and landmine survivors. CBID facilitators, employed 
by CSOs and in interaction with local authorities and communities, 
provide support that is based on the specific medical, rehabilitative, 
psychological, and socioeconomic needs of those identified in tar-
get communities. 
The CBID Demonstration Model is an evidence-based participa-
tory approach that engages the whole community to identify needs 
and remove barriers to create a more supportive and inclusive en-
vironment for persons with disabilities. Guided by the philosophy 
of DID, the goal of USAID Okard is to improve and sustain the in-
dependent living and functional ability of persons with disabilities, 
including UXO and landmine survivors, regardless of age, sex, gen-
der expression, or ethnicity. The USAID Okard team and its civil 
society partners who implement the CBID Demonstration Model 
work closely with the government of Laos at the central level and 
in two pilot districts, along with communities to implement and 
test the Lao National Disability Policy and the Lao Rehabilitation 
Strategy. USAID Okard believes that if the government of Laos and 
communities are effectively engaged and mobilized toward disabil-
ity inclusion, and if case management enables increased function-
ing and participation of persons with disabilities, then these two 
Image 1. Toumkham, a CBID facilitator from the Quality of Life Association, a civil society organization in Xieng Khouang Province, 
demonstrates how to use a flipbook for community awareness raising. The flipbook explains various health conditions with the goal 
of reducing stigma and helping villagers engage in disability inclusion within their communities. 
All images courtesy of World Education, Inc.
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components will enhance and sustain full participation of persons 
with disabilities in Laotian society.
After raising awareness on disability inclusion, the CBID facilita-
tors from CSOs engage with stakeholders in practical conversations 
about how they can contribute to removing barriers that prevent peo-
ple with disabilities, including those affected by landmine and UXO 
accidents, from participating in community life. The goal is to im-
prove perceptions and create an enabling environment for disabil-
ity inclusion within communities. For example, the CBID facilitator 
might engage village authorities to help monitor and provide support 
to UXO and landmine accident survivors and their families or hold 
meetings about disability inclusion with teachers and students at a 
local school. These activities help to create a common understand-
ing that disability is part of human diversity. Moreover, this process 
can help demonstrate how long-term development can encompass 
disability inclusion by reducing barriers for persons with disabilities 
within communities and encourage stakeholders to examine ways 
that public spaces can be accessible for all. 
In the second component—case management—the project as-
sesses and analyzes the unmet needs of people with disabilities 
and their households, and then develops a family-centered ac-
tion plan, provides interventions, and monitors outcomes. When 
working with families, CBID facilitators use compassionate com-
munication to empower the family; provide psychosocial support; 
advise on home-based rehabilitation and accessibility accommo-
dations; and provide referrals to medical, rehabilitation, and as-
sistive product providers as well as to more complex mental health 
and psychosocial support (MHPSS) services. In the case of UXO 
and landmine survivors, the CBID facilitator also provides them 
with information about the War Victims Medical Fund and con-
nects them with a district National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
official, who can help ensure that they receive reimbursement for 
their medical costs. CBID livelihood officers support the most 
vulnerable persons with disabilities to develop income generat-
ing activities (IGAs) based on an adapted Ultra-Poor Graduation 
Approach,10 originally developed by Building Resources Across 
Communities (BRAC) in Bangladesh. CBID facilitators also con-
nect persons with disabilities and their families to educational and 
vocational training and social services while working to strength-
en referral networks across these sectors. Each CBID facilitator 
manages approximately twenty cases like Maikorly and her family, 
helping them access resources that will optimize their functioning, 
economic self-sufficiency, and well-being.
The CBID Demonstration Model is implemented by two CSOs: 
Quality of Life Association (QLA) based in Xieng Khouang 
Province, and the Association for Rural Mobilisation and 
Improvement (ARMI) in Savannakhet Province. These two prov-
inces were identified as CBID Demonstration Model pilot areas 
because they are both predominantly rural and severely contami-
nated by landmines and UXO. 
Developing a Comprehensive Needs 
Assessment Tool for Case Management
Knowledge about the prevalence, needs, and priorities of UXO and 
landmine survivors is a common challenge for donor states due to a 
lack of data on both quantitative impact (whether victims access ser-
vices and initiatives) and qualitative impact (whether taking into ac-
count victims’ specific needs leads to improvement in their quality 
of life). At the same time, globally, there is limited evidence of the ef-
fectiveness of CBID on individuals’ levels of functioning. The USAID 
Okard Results Framework incorporates indicators that will provide 
evidence on access to social services and livelihoods opportunities, 
which can then be disaggregated by cause of health condition, includ-
ing UXO and landmine accidents. These indicators include the “num-
ber of people receiving health and related rehabilitation services 
(including medical, rehabilitation, assistive products and MHPSS),” 
the “number of people gaining new or better employment and access-
ing technical vocational education training (TVET)” and evidence 
of the impact of these services on quality of life, and the “number of 
people with increased function, economic self-sufficiency and well-
being.” To measure these indicators, WEI and the Nossal Institute 
of Global Health at the University of Melbourne have developed a 
CBID Modular Tool to accurately measure needs at the individual 
and household levels. This allows for the collection of rich data while 
also helping CBID facilitators build a comprehensive understanding 
of the situations of individual persons with disabilities and their fam-
ilies. The Modular Tool has eight modules that collect data related 
to household demographics, education, function and use of assistive 
products, physical health conditions, mental health, access and utili-
zation of health services, economic participation, and well-being. In 
addition, one of the eight modules focuses on the role of the caregiver 
and his or her health, well-being, and productivity.
Identifying Needs
Following a community screening (step one in the case manage-
ment process), the CBID facilitator visits Maikorly at her home to 
complete the needs assessment using the Modular Tool (case man-
agement step two). Initial questions help the CBID facilitator under-
stand Maikorly’s family structure, the education levels of the different 
members of her household, and the family’s socioeconomic status. As 
the CBID facilitator asks more questions, she learns about Maikorly’s 
mobility, the accessibility of her home, and her ability to complete 
daily activities and participate in community life. By the end of the 
first home visit, data are collected on Maikorly’s health and any bar-
riers that restrict her access to health services.
On the second home visit, the CBID facilitator completes the last 
four modules of the Modular Tool, exploring Maikorly’s psycho- 
social needs related to possible anxiety, stress, depression, and PTSD. 
Questions explore the extent to which Maikorly is able to access 
health, rehabilitation, and MHPSS services, her health-seeking be-
haviors, and her overall perception of her well-being. This visit will 
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also examine the level of support Maikorly’s husband provides to her 
and her children following the accident and what impact this has had 
on his productivity as well as physical and mental health. Finally, the 
CBID facilitator collects data about the current employment status of 
Maikorly and her family as well as their ability to access financial lit-
eracy and skills trainings.
The Modular Tool was developed by a team of technical experts 
and involved the review, selection, and refinement of questions from 
the Washington Group on Disability Statistics11 and other psycho-
metrically tested surveys12 to construct the eight modules, which, as 
a whole, form a cohesive, practical instrument. Response categories 
serve as triggers for unmet needs, and decision-making algorithms 
raise red flags to inform CBID facilitators of where it could be benefi-
cial to target interventions. Specific questions comprise scaled scores 
to measure function and well-being. The tool has been digitized us-
ing the open-source software platform Kobo Toolbox, allowing CBID 
facilitators to collect data through the Kobo Collect application on a 
tablet. After data are uploaded to a central database, the program gen-
erates an automated summary of results for the CBID facilitator to dis-
cuss with Maikorly and her family as they collaboratively develop an 
action plan. This process utilizes a family-centered approach, under- 
pinned by the principle that Maikorly and her family understand 
their needs and are in the best position to inform the CBID facili-
tator of the priority interventions connected to their unique fami-
ly situation. This also helps build a supportive family environment 
so Maikorly can achieve optimal functioning and participation. The 
CBID facilitator then returns to Maikorly’s home to discuss the re-
sults from the Modular Tool. During this session, the facilitator sug-
gests interventions that could address Maikorly’s unmet needs and, 
with her family, she develops an action plan. 
Interventions Could Include the Following:
Health and rehabilitation services assess her functional mobil-
ity and provide appropriate assistive products, such as a prosthesis, 
wheelchair, commode chair, and other devices to help Maikorly com-
plete daily activities. The costs of accommodation and transportation 
to access these services are covered when needed. At the same time, 
the CBID facilitator can assess the home environment to see what ad-
aptations can be made to improve accessibility, for example, widening 
a doorway or installing a ramp. The CBID facilitator may also follow 
up on the home-based exercise program provided to Maikorly by re-
habilitation professionals. These interventions would contribute to 
optimized functioning and increase Maikorly’s participation in daily 
activities and community life. 
Psychosocial support by a health specialist provides counselling 
related to her feelings of sadness, suicidal thoughts, or changes to her 
self-image as a result of her injuries.
Peer-to-peer support with another UXO/landmine survivor or 
person with disabilities builds confidence in dealing with the chang-
es in her life following the UXO accident. This can help create a space 
where Maikorly feels comfortable seeking out advice related to her 
daily functioning and receiving support when she encounters chal-
lenges or stigmatization. 
Support to access an income generating activity (IGA), which 
might involve providing Maikorly and her family with new assets 
to start a small business, supporting her family to expand or diver-
sify their existing assets, such as land and livestock. To help build 
her capacity for economic self-sufficiency, Maikorly might also ac-
cess enterprise coaching, financial literacy training, and, if needed, 
vocational skills training. 
Support to her husband via caregiver training better equips 
him to assist Maikorly. Trainings include discussions about the 
distribution of household tasks related to traditional roles and 
gender stereotyping. 
Monitoring the Impact of CBID Case 
Management on Functioning and Well-Being 
The CBID facilitator continues to visit Maikorly and her family to 
provide coaching and continuous monitoring of the action plan im-
plementation, ensuring that referrals to services are followed up on 
and completed. After approximatively six months, once specific ac-
tions and objectives related to each intervention have been achieved, 
the CBID facilitator repeats the CBID Modular Tool to measure 
what has changed and how. Key questions include: To what extent 
has Maikorly’s functioning and well-being improved? In what ways 
has her husband’s approach to caregiving changed? And to what ex-
tent has the family’s socioeconomic status and capacity for economic 
self-sufficiency changed as a result of participating in the program? 
By comparing initial needs assessment data with data at the end of 
intervention, the case management process captures the quantitative 
and qualitative changes that indicate the impact of CBID interven-
tions on quality of life, based on the number and type of services and 
support Maikorly has received. 
Image 2. Teuy (left), and Peter (right), both UXO survivors, partici-
pate in a peer-to-peer support session. These sessions allow UXO 
and landmine survivors to connect, share personal experiences, 
and provide support to others who have been in similar situations.
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Looking Forward
While contributing to the implementation of the UXO/Mine 
Action Victim Assistance Strategy 2014–2020 of the government of 
Laos, USAID Okard advocates for a broader disability inclusive mod-
el. By integrating UXO/mine action victim assistance in a broader 
CBID Demonstration Model, USAID Okard also helps to implement 
and test the new National Disability Law and Policy and the National 
Rehabilitation Strategy, creating stronger systems to assist all victims 
of injury regardless of the cause of the accident. To ensure the long-
term sustainability of DID, while also applying a person-centered ap-
proach through the CBID case-management process, USAID Okard 
works closely with the government of Laos to build ownership of in-
clusive policies that enhance equal access to social services for all per-
sons with disabilities, including UXO and landmine survivors. 
The CBID facilitators from two national CSOs (QLA and ARMI) 
work collaboratively with provincial and district focal points from 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Health. 
Through the CBID Modular Tool, the case-management process gen-
erates quantitative and qualitative data that demonstrate what types of 
support and services have been provided to persons with disabilities, 
including UXO and landmine survivors, and how this has impacted 
their functional ability and quality of life. This information is used at 
the central level to inform policy makers on progress, successes, and 
challenges directly related to the government of Laos strategy and its 
commitments to the CRPD. 
USAID Okard also provides QLA and ARMI with the opportu-
nity to access other donor funding and supports them to build their 
governance and managerial capacity to sustain their organizations. 
This way, they will be able to expand CBID to other districts beyond 
the present geographic reach of USAID Okard so that persons like 
Maikorly and her family can continue to benefit from the assistance 
they need in the aftermath of UXO/landmine accidents. The CBID 
Demonstration Model aims to develop inclusive, resilient, and equi-
table communities where UXO/landmine survivors and persons with 
disabilities are empowered, and to prove that effective inclusive devel-
opment can happen at the community level. 
See endnotes page 59
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Image 3. Bouaphone (left), a CBID Facilitator from the Quality 
of Life Association, uses a tablet implementing the CBID 
Modular Tool. Using the short set of questions developed by the 
Washington Group on Disability Statistics and other psychometri-
cally tested surveys, the Modular Tool will help identify persons 
with disabilities within communities and will help to assess an 
individual’s needs.
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The global ocean economy is predicted to grow by more than 100 percent between 2010 and 2030. By then, more than 40 million people are going to be employed by the maritime in-
dustry.1 Recognizing this potential, the European Union (EU) de-
vised a “Blue Growth” strategy that seeks to reap the anticipated 
economic benefits.2 While technological advancements allow for an 
increased utilization of marine resources, the newly gained access to 
untapped opportunities forces coastal nations to simultaneously face 
the challenge of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and chemical war-
fare agents (CWAs) in the sea.
FACING EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS 
OF WAR IN THE BALTIC SEA
Like all European seas, the Baltic Sea is still heavily affected by 
ERW and CWAs from the world wars. One estimate suggests that 
around 300,000 metric tons (t) of conventional munitions are still 
present in German Baltic waters alone.3 Here, explosive ordnance 
was in part introduced due to naval and air battles and mine lay-
ing activities. During both world wars, between 100,000 and 150,000 
naval mines were laid in the Baltic.4 An additional mode of entry of 
ERW and CWAs into the Baltic Sea were post-war dumping activities. 
Up to 65,000 t of chemical ordnance were dumped in the Baltic Sea.3
Against this backdrop, the EU seeks to organize the efficient, safe, 
and sustainable use of its waters. A framework for maritime spatial 
planning has been established to take advantage of the economic po-
tential of the European seas and to increase transboundary cooper-
ation while simultaneously protecting the environment.5 The main 
goal of the EU’s Marine Strategy Framework Directive is to "achieve a 
good environmental status of European seas by 2020.6" The presence 
of ERW and CWAs impedes ambitions to make use of the Baltic’s eco-
nomic potential as well as with the aim of doing so in a sustainable 
and ecosystem-friendly fashion.
Explosive Ordnance in the 
BALTIC SEA
NEW TOOLS FOR 
DECISION MAKERS
In recent years, research groups in Europe have focused on the de-
velopment of new tools that provide guidance on how to treat sub-
merged ERW and CWAs. Some of these tools are discussed in this 
article, which is the first publication wherein their potential integra-
tion is described. The DAIMON (Decision Aid for Marine Munitions) 
decision-support system (DSS) suggests management options for 
ERW and CWAs at different geographic locations at a strategic level. 
One of these management options is site-specific monitoring, which 
may be performed with the help of a new biomonitoring approach. 
Another management option is the execution of an explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD) campaign. For the implementation of this op-
tion, a comprehensive quality guideline was published.
THE NEW DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
The presence of ERW and CWAs at any given location consti-
tutes an inherent risk. The DSS bases its decision-making process on 
the categorization of this risk, which is a function of a multitude of 
by Torsten Frey [ Leipzig University ], Jacek Beldowski, Ph.D. [ Polish Academy of Sciences ], 
and Edmund Maser, Ph.D. [ Kiel University ]
Image 1. A corroded German KC-250 mustard bomb, found at 
the Bornholm dumpsite was first recognized on a sonogram, 
then investigated by an ROV, while final identification was done 
by classifying the bursting charge with the help of the muni-
tions database.
Image courtesy of DAIMON project.
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aspects. Some ERW items may be buried under sediment, or their 
munitions compounds (MCs) may have already leached into the envi-
ronment. Such circumstances limit the imminent threat these items 
pose for the ecosystem. On the other hand, some ERW emit toxic ef-
fluents to nearby sediments or constitute a hazard for fishing vessels 
and workers employed in the offshore industry.7 In order to support 
decision makers with the management of ERW and CWA sites, it is 
required to assess their risk level. The DAIMON project responded 
to this requirement by creating a user-friendly web-based tool.8 This 
system is able to evaluate available local and regional data and to sug-
gest management options to decision makers in Baltic Sea states. It 
utilizes data on object properties, site-specific environmental condi-
tions, and impact on biota.
Object properties include the type and current state of ERW and 
CWAs. Information on the object type is derived from technical 
surveys and object recognition with the help of 
hydroacoustic imaging, visual inspection, and an 
online munitions database (Image 1).9 Corrosion as-
sessment for present condition and corrosion mod-
elling for future condition provide information on 
object integrity. Environmental properties that are 
processed by the DSS include oceanographic data 
(which are integrated from public HELCOM and 
SEDNET databases), modelled spread of contam-
ination by bottom currents by a high-resolution 
hydrodynamic model,10 and concentration mea-
surements of degradation products from MCs in 
nearby sediments. The impact on biota is included 
in a dedicated database, containing biomarker data 
of ca. 20,000 fish specimens, which were collected in 
munitions dumpsite areas.
All of this information is processed by neu-
ral networks, which were trained on data from the 
dumpsites and contain weighting factors for each 
parameter. Experts used all of the parameters en-
tered into the DSS for risk assessment calculations 
during case studies, and calibrated neural nets to 
produce comparable outputs. The data interpreta-
tion is based on toxicity thresholds obtained during 
the DAIMON project, and a full list of references 
is available in the DSS documentation.9 It further-
more uses specialized algorithms, which involve, 
inter alia, the number of ERW items in close prox-
imity to one another and health stressors for marine 
biota. The result is subsequently judged by anoth-
er neural network, which considers the potentially- 
affected subjects of protection such as fishery, ship-
ping, offshore structures, and tourists.
The DSS presents users with a comprehensive 
risk-assessment report, which includes color-scale 
coding for both the risk level and the confidence 
level, allowing them to decide either how to manage the site or to 
collect additional relevant data to aspire for more informed deci-
sion making (Figure 1). If not considered a threat, the DSS may ad-
vise the decision maker to omit action for some ERW and CWA 
items. For other items it may propose a number of management op-
tions. These include monitoring, if the system is warning for de-
layed consequences; establishing restrictions for maritime sectors, 
in case the items present a latent safety hazard or could become 
more dangerous if disturbed; or EOD, if items present an immedi-
ate threat for a given subject of protection.
The DSS is currently under development. It is exclusively con-
cerned with the Baltic Sea but could be extrapolated to other geo-
graphic areas. It uses data that were collected during research 
projects and by maritime protection agencies in a comprehensive 
way, thereby allowing for informed decision making.
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Figure 1. An example report of an ERW site located at the border between German 
and Polish territorial waters. The report was generated with the Decision Support 
System in the web-based software AMUCAD.org.
Figure courtesy of EGEOS GmbH, 2019.
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BIOMONITORING OF SUBMERGED ERW
The informed decision to necessitate site monitoring requires a plan 
on how to perform the monitoring. A holistic, environmental monitor-
ing program for conventional ERW in the sea has thus been developed 
as part of the joint scientific project UDEMM (environmental moni-
toring for the delaboration of munitions on the seabed) by partners 
GEOMAR Helmholtz-Centre for Ocean Research Kiel, Institute of 
Toxicology and Pharmacology of the Christian-Albrechts-University 
in Kiel, and Leibnitz Institute for Baltic Sea Research Warnemünde. 
The concept includes the use of hydroacoustic and optical means such 
as towed cameras, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and div-
ers, as well as sediment and water sampling, with subsequent chemical 
analyses of munition contaminants. It also integrates biomonitoring, 
which is a long-term possibility to classify ERW.11
Monitoring is a collective term for all types of systematic record-
ings, measurements, or observations of an operation or process by 
means of technical aids or other observation systems. The term bio-
monitoring is used, inter alia, in ecology and describes the periodic 
measuring of the stock and state of health of plants and animals as well 
as their communities with the aim of determining the quality of envi-
ronmental conditions. Modern analytical methods enable experts to 
record many pollutants in very low, environmentally-relevant concen-
trations. The goal of biomonitoring is the protection of the ecosphere 
and of human health.
A main hazard of ERW in the marine environment is the chronic 
contamination of the marine ecosystem and marine organisms with 
toxic explosives continuously leaching from corroding ERW. In the 
worst cases, this may lead to toxic substances entering into marine 
and human food chains, so that seafood consumers may be heavily 
exposed. It is universally accepted that explosive MCs pose a threat to 
marine organisms and the marine ecosphere. In addition, health risks 
for humans that are exposed to trinitrotoluene (TNT) have been de-
termined. Notable toxic manifestations have included aplastic anemia, 
toxic hepatitis, cataracts, hepatomegaly, and liver cancer.
For a number of reasons, mussels (bivalves) are particularly suit-
able for the detection and recording of explosive compounds that 
leach from corroding ERW in the marine environment.12 They are 
widespread representatives of the marine fauna and are benthic and 
sedentary organisms—meaning that they live a mostly stationary life 
on the seabed—and constitute a main source of food for fish, birds, 
crustaceans, and starfish. In addition, their filter feeding lifestyle and 
slower metabolic rate favor the absorption and bioaccumulation of ex-
plosives. Further, they are a resistant species which can thrive in unfa-
vorable conditions. Finally, bivalves are an important seafood species 
and can be used as indicators for the entry of toxic substances into the 
marine food chain, even at low concentrations.13 While conditions in 
the sea that change in the short-term (temperature, salinity, and cur-
rents) make it difficult to continuously assess the ecological hazards of 
ERW by other means, biomonitoring with mussels offers the opportu-
nity for long-term studies to predict potential risks for the ecosphere 
and for seafood consumers.
Mussel monitoring was used in the German dumpsite of 
Kolberger Heide (Image 2). The area served as a test site to develop 
new methods and workflows for detection, monitoring, and assess-
ment of ERW in the marine environment.12 Divers placed moorings 
with mussel bags (Image 3) at various positions near a pile of about 
seventy moored mines distributed over an area of approximately 70 
× 30 sq m. After recovery, the bioconcentration levels of 2,4,6-TNT 
and its main metabolites 2-amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene (2ADNT), 
and 4-amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene (4ADNT) were measured in mus-
sel tissue by means of two gas chromatography-mass spectrometry/
mass spectrometry (GC-MS/MS) analytical methods.14 The result of 
such mussel monitoring may then be entered into the DSS, which 
will increase the system’s capacity to suggest management options 
for a specific area.
Image 2. A synthetic aperture sonar image of around seventy 
moored mines at Kolberger Heide in German territorial waters. 
The location’s distance to the closest German beach is 2 km.
Image courtesy of German Navy, 2012.
Image 3. A mooring with a net containing mussels that was 
placed adjacent to a corroding moored mine.
Image courtesy of Diving Center of Kiel University.
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One of the most important re-
sults was that comparatively higher 
total concentrations of the differ-
ent TNT metabolites were usually 
detected in mussels placed directly 
on a free-lying piece of hexanite,15 a 
widely used military explosive that 
was used by the German Navy dur-
ing both world wars. Lower con-
centrations were found in mussels 
placed in the immediate vicinity of 
dumped mines in different states of 
corrosion.16 This unexpected result 
is a strong case against the common 
practice of blasting dumped mu-
nitions for clearing purposes. As a 
consequence of low-order def lagra-
tions, large areas might be contam-
inated with unexploded materials, 
such as hexanite, thereby increasing 
the availability of the chemicals to 
the surrounding biota.
GUIDANCE ON 
PERFORMING 
OFFSHORE EOD
If an ERW item or a dumpsite pres-
ents an immediate hazard to human 
life or offshore assets, an EOD cam-
paign is imperative. Every offshore 
construction and exploration proj-
ect in the Baltic renders the execu-
tion of at least the survey phases of an 
EOD campaign essential. However, 
numerous challenges in connec-
tion with offshore EOD exist, and 
the process is often performed in 
the absence of universally-accepted 
standards. There was no recognized 
industry-wide method of assessing 
the suitability of organizational pro-
cedures, deployed personnel, devic-
es used, and the handling of these 
devices during EOD. This situation 
was mainly owed to the fact that a 
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Figure 2. Flow chart illustrating the 
phases of offshore explosive ord-
nance disposal representing the 
top layer of organization in the 
quality guideline.
Figure courtesy of Leipzig 
University, IIRM, 2019.
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framework for formal recognition of any of these aspects was ab-
sent. In response, Leipzig University’s Institute for Infrastructure 
and Resources Management (IIRM) developed a “Quality Guideline 
for Offshore Explosive Ordnance Disposal.”17 This effort was part of 
the RoBEMM project (Robotic Underwater Salvage and Disposal 
Process with the Technology to Remove Explosive Ordnance in the 
Sea, in Particular in Coastal and Shallow Waters).
The development of the quality guideline was initiated with a 
comprehensive literature review, with the aim of identifying the ba-
sic actors and processes of offshore EOD. The International Mine 
Action Standard (IMAS) for Underwater Survey and Clearance of 
Explosive Ordnance (EO)18, served as an input of this initial step. Of 
great importance for the future recognition of the quality guideline 
was the involvement of representatives of all those stakeholders who 
would ultimately be affected by the finished document. Accordingly, 
stakeholder workshops were organized during which the findings 
of the literature review were verified, clarified, and expanded upon. 
Next, a preliminary version of the quality guideline was drafted and 
experts were given the opportunity to annotate. As these comments 
were processed, it became apparent that some expert opinions were 
conflicting, and thus expert groups were held to moderate these dif-
fering views and prepare the final document.
The resulting quality guideline covers the entire procedure of 
offshore EOD. A general section at the beginning of the document 
includes a glossary and a register of relevant normative and legal doc-
uments. It contains sections that define the overall competence re-
quirements and mandatory qualification verification of the actors 
and their personnel. The subsequent chapters each describe one of 
the four phases, which have been divided as follows (Figure 2):
• Phase I: Preliminary Survey (five processes)
• Phase II: Technical Survey (eight processes)
• Phase III: Investigation of Target Points (nine processes)
• Phase IV: Clearance and Disposal (eight processes)
The document outlines these phases and subsequently subdivides 
them into their processes. For each process it provides a general de-
scription as well as potential deviations from the standard procedure. 
Furthermore, it details the functions and responsibilities of actors rel-
evant to the process. Where necessary, it describes suitable technol-
ogies and their way of application. Finally, it supplements processes 
requiring documentation and reporting with lists of necessary con-
tent items. The ultimate section of the quality guideline is a reference 
section for technical and environmental quality drivers, which influ-
ence the quality of offshore EOD work. The quality drivers are defined, 
their interrelations are identified, and where possible, threshold values 
for minimum operational requirements are suggested.
The “Quality Guideline for Offshore Explosive Treatment” is avail-
able in German and English, and focuses on the execution of EOD in 
German waters. The principles and practices it suggests, however, can 
be applied to any location in the Baltic Sea.
THE TOOLS ARE READY FOR APPLICATION
The tools described in this article demonstrate the eagerness of the 
European scientific community to actively contribute to the devel-
opment of approaches, which are meant to respond to the challenge 
of offshore ERW and CWAs. While all of the presented instruments 
and concepts are beneficial on their own, their benefits further in-
crease when combined. They may be picked up by national and state 
authorities, militaries, offshore construction companies, and EOD 
specialists to tackle the ERW and CWA challenge in the field.
As economic and ecologic pressure on the Baltic Sea increase, 
ERW and CWAs constitute one of a myriad of challenges that need 
to be addressed. The DSS, the monitoring concept, and the quality 
guideline are aids that will help fulfill the vision of maritime spa-
tial planning, thereby achieving sustainable and cooperative Blue 
Growth. The tools are ready for application. 
See endnotes page 60
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Image 1. The first abandoned improvised mine (AIM) uncovered by HALO clearance teams in Helmand Province, southern Afghanistan. 
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been widely used in Afghanistan since the mid-2000s, presenting a significant and life-threatening hazard to the civilian population. As areas become free from conf lict and permissible for humanitarian clearance, an effective response is required to protect civilians. With the support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German 
Federal Foreign Office, and in coordination with the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC; the Afghan national mine ac-
tion authority) and other stakeholders, The HALO Trust (HALO) has developed and implemented a successful proof of concept for man-
ual clearance of victim operated IEDs (VOIEDs). While VOIEDs are cleared in other countries and have previously been cleared in 
Afghanistan, this project, delivered in Helmand province, has provided the opportunity to develop and test safer and more efficient meth-
ods for the targeted humanitarian clearance of abandoned improvised mines (AIM) in the current Afghan context. This article explains 
the path HALO has taken to deliver the proof of concept, some of the results so far, and future plans for supporting the sector.
by Alexander Tan [ The HALO Trust ]
IED CLEARANCE CAPACITY
 AFGHANISTAN
The Development of a Humanitarian 
in
THE AFGHAN CONTEXT
IEDs as Part of the Afghan Conflict. After the coalition of 
international military forces removed the government of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan in 2001, the regular and increasing presence 
of international military forces in the country encouraged armed op-
position groups (AOGs) to adopt increasingly asymmetric tactics. 
The use of IEDs increased as conventional munitions became less 
available and effective against the technologically-advanced inter-
national military forces. Since this time, IEDs in Afghanistan have 
resulted in the death of thousands of civilians, of which a large pro-
portion were inflicted by VOIEDs. 
Terminology. In Afghanistan, the mine action sector has agreed 
that VOIEDs that function like conventional mines shall be known 
as improvised mines. They adhere to the definition found in the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC): “a mine designed to be 
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person that will 
incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” In Afghanistan, the 
term AIM is used when improvised mines are no longer part of the 
active conflict.1
Engaging with Improvised Mines. In late 2016, the Afghan 
government, understanding the impact that improvised mines were 
having on the civilian population, requested the assistance of the 
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Afghan humanitarian mine action sector (the Mine 
Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA)) to de-
velop a response to the crisis. An initial assessment 
of affected districts identified large amounts of AIM 
contamination that were causing fatal or life-threatening accidents 
and posed a direct threat to the civilian population.
In early 2017, community representatives from several districts in 
central Helmand Province approached HALO with requests for the 
clearance of improvised mines from their villages. This prompted 
HALO to begin two strands of work: the first to determine the ratio-
nale for MAPA to engage with improvised mines; the second to develop 
a technical response to mitigate the threat posed by improvised mines.
The rationale for engagement was an important precursor to the de-
velopment of the technical response and to the proof of concept. The 
work was carried out by consultant Dr. Rebecca Roberts and fund-
ed by the United Kingdom’s Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund 
(CSSF). It explored the suitability of humanitarian clearance of impro-
vised mines by MAPA under existing international and Afghan legal 
frameworks, and under existing MAPA strategies and policies. The 
views of a wide range of stakeholders including DMAC, other Afghan 
ministries, donors, and mine action operators were all considered. 
Dr. Roberts’ report found that there is a robust legal framework for 
humanitarian clearance of improvised mines under Afghan and in-
ternational law where it is intended to protect civilians and their hu-
man rights. To conduct clearance, the report found that MAPA would 
need to maintain its status of neutrality in order to operate according 
to humanitarian principles of “do no harm,” distance itself from on-
going conflicts, and deal with devices not considered part of the ac-
tive conflict. 
DEVELOPING THE 
TECHNICAL RESPONSE
To develop the technical response to mitigate the threat of im-
provised mines, HALO began expanding its understanding of the 
problem and preparing its in-country capacity. HALO assessed the 
physical environment where the clearance teams would be working, 
as well as the threats likely to be found in central Helmand Province 
and across Afghanistan.
In developing new techniques and procedures, HALO’s approach 
was to extend existing humanitarian mine clearance practices by adapt-
ing and incorporating the relevant parts of military search and disposal 
techniques. This was to ensure that the knowledge, lessons learned, and 
experience from previous military operations could be assessed and in-
corporated into humanitarian practice where beneficial. This task was 
undertaken in early 2018 by bringing former-military IED disposal 
(IEDD) operators and humanitarian mine clearance operators together 
to devise, trial, and practice standard operating procedures (SOPs) tai-
lored for the Afghan context.
HALO Afghanistan’s program was able to draw on 30 years of in-
country experience of clearing explosive hazards. This helped to en-
sure the development of capability and the operational response were 
contextually appropriate. Similarly, the project was sensitive to lo-
cal politics, local security dynamics, and considerate of cultural and 
social norms.2 With the support of HALO global experts, HALO 
Afghanistan developed SOPs and a training model that was then vet-
ted externally by a third party providing an additional level of as-
surance. For this, HALO used the services of Artios Ltd. given their 
military, commercial, and NGO IEDD experience as well as their close 
involvement in the development of IMAS. Additionally, the SOPs 
and training were accredited by DMAC and reviewed by the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).
 As part of the design of this project, HALO identified lessons and 
challenges experienced during the implementation phase in order to 
assist MAPA and inform the development of a wider AIM mine ac-
tion capacity in Afghanistan.
Humanitarian Clearance, Consent, and Access. In 
Afghanistan, humanitarian clearance will only be conducted in 
permissible areas where active hostilities have ceased. AIMs in 
Afghanistan are almost always in areas that have experienced 
Image 2. A HALO training device shown in a distributed configu-
ration, with the pressure plate, main charge, and battery pack 
separated from each other and connected with linking wire.
Images 3 and 4. Examples of carbon rod pres-
sure and bare pressure plates splayed, showing 
the reduced metal electrical contacts inside the 
pressure plate.
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significant conflict. To keep clearance teams safe, HALO liaises 
extensively with key stakeholders to ensure that those with an 
interest understand our intent, and provide their consent for us to 
access areas to conduct clearance. HALO also conducts liaison with 
a variety of actors at a regional level to ensure that other actors are 
informed and aware of our activities and to address any concerns that 
may be raised. If required, clearance can be stopped and teams relo-
cated until those concerns have been satisfied. In Helmand, HALO 
has had the full support of the local community and has been able to 
work uninterrupted. Looking ahead, obtaining and maintaining con-
sent will likely be a key challenge requiring careful liaison and rela-
tionship building as AIM operations expand. 
UNDERSTANDING IED DESIGN 
IN AFGHANISTAN
In building the technical response, it has been necessary for 
HALO to understand the design of IEDs in Afghanistan. IEDs in 
Afghanistan have evolved to defeat many modern detection methods 
and are usually intended to target the activities and tactics of specific 
military units working in an area. Two design elements of IEDs that 
are most relevant to this are the layout of the device and the materi-
al the switch is manufactured from. The use of a variety of detection 
technology by military forces may be one of the biggest driving fac-
tors for the evolution of these design features. In addition, IEDs in 
Afghanistan are known to include anti-handling elements, as either 
secondary components or secondary devices. 
Device Layout. Almost all improvised mines in Afghanistan are 
electrically initiated and contain electrical circuits. These IEDs have 
batteries as a power source; batteries are easily found with a metal 
detector because of their high-metal content. However, the electri-
cal wire linking the battery, the switch (often a pressure plate), and 
the main charge (with electric detonator) can be distributed around 
the emplacement location (see Image 3). This allows the emplace-
ment of components to be more varied than a conventional pressure- 
activated mine and can make them more difficult to detect. For exam-
ple, a pressure plate and a main charge with either a low-or no-metal 
content may be placed in the same location on a path, while the bat-
tery pack is placed several meters away from the path. This then plac-
es the easily detectable battery pack outside the natural search area, 
and makes the device more complex to detect.
The location of components can be configured to achieve different ef-
fects. For example, a main charge is easily placed away from a pressure 
plate targeting a vehicle, so that while the switch is activated by a vehicle 
tire, the main charge will function under the center of the vehicle where 
it is likely to inflict significantly greater damage.
Switch (Pressure Plate) Material. While there have been a 
number of switch types used in improvised mines in Afghanistan, in-
cluding tripwires and pressure-release switches, it is anticipated that the 
vast majority of devices that humanitarian operators will clear will have 
pressure-plate switches. These are currently found in three main ma-
terial types: high-metal-content pressure plates, which have large met-
al contacts; carbon-rod pressure plates made from a nonmetallic but 
Image 5. Local community members and survivors show the crater caused by a VOIED.
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electrically-conducive materials (commonly found in household batter-
ies); and bare-wire pressure plates that use stripped wire as the electrical 
contacts. These switch types have different levels of detectability.
Device Design. Due to the nature of improvised mines found in 
Afghanistan, AIM clearance in Afghanistan is significantly different 
from that of conventional mine clearance. Specific clearance meth-
ods, search tools, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques 
are required.
Many AIMs in Afghanistan are assessed to have been emplaced 
with a separation of high-metal signal batteries and low-or no-metal 
signal pressure plates, which present challenges for clearance using 
standard techniques. The use of materials such as carbon rods can 
significantly reduce the detectability of the device and requires spe-
cialist IED detectors to be used. Specialized detectors are needed to 
be able to detect the location of the switch in an AIM, as this is likely 
to be the hardest component to locate while remaining the most sen-
sitive part of the device.
Search Patterns. By understanding the layout of the device, clear-
ance teams are able to adjust their search and clearance procedures to 
find more detectable and less sensitive components of a device before 
finding the harder-to-detect components. An example of this would be 
the deployment of deminers parallel to a path where batteries were as-
sessed to be offset. The larger footprint of most AIMs has also encour-
aged the adoption of “2 m breaching” and “linear clearance” techniques. 
These are search patterns that allow a greater surface area to be searched 
prior to the deminer moving forward. This increases the chance that 
multiple components are initially located and reduces the chance that 
AIM components may be located in the uncleared area to the side of the 
deminer while remaining linked to components within the deminer’s 
lane. This makes it easier and safer for the deminers and EOD operators 
to work after locating a potential device. 
Device Employment. AIMs in Afghanistan are typically em-
placed in smaller numbers than conventional minefields or the IED 
belts used in parts of Iraq. In addition, the AIM contamination en-
countered is typically in rural or semi-rural areas usually in small 
fields, compounds, or lengths of road or tracks. This requires survey 
teams and clearance team supervisors to be trained to recognize dif-
ferent contamination, potentially laid over different periods of time. 
For example, improvised mines in one area may use high-metal- 
content pressure plates and be laid in the middle of roads to tar-
get vehicles in the first contamination period, while the improvised 
mines may have carbon-rod pressure plates and be laid to the side of 
the roads targeting foot soldiers in the second contamination peri-
od. By understanding how IEDs are used, clearance methods can be 
adapted to ensure the safest and most effective clearance.
Team Management. The use of new techniques and procedures 
against a more complex threat requires a significantly higher level of 
supervision than that required by traditional mine clearance teams. 
HALO AIM clearance teams currently consist of four deminers with 
one team leader, who is also trained as an AIM EOD operator for 
this project. This high management ratio allows for strong supervi-
sion of clearance in and around compounds and allows the experi-
enced team leaders more time to assess possible contamination and 
device patterns on their tasks. While the ratio of deminers to team 
leaders may change as HALO becomes more confident with AIM 
clearance, and while the role of AIM EOD operators may be separat-
ed from the role of team leader, the ratio of deminers to supervising 
staff is expected to remain significantly lower than traditional mine 
clearance teams.
IMPLEMENTATION
With the proof of concept receiving joint funding from the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Federal 
Foreign Office in June 2018, HALO was able to proceed with the 
recruitment and training of an AIM non-technical survey team 
(NTS) and two manual AIM clearance teams. The AIM NTS team 
Images 6 (left) and 7 (right). An example of the standard Afghanistan 
"one man, one lane" (OMOL) technique with a searched area of 
1.4 m x 0.3 m, compared to the HALO AIM 2 m breaching tech-
nique with a searched area of 2.4 m x 70 cm.
52
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss3/1
ISSUE 23.3 @ WINTER 2020 53
was deployed operationally in Helmand in July 2018. The two man-
ual AIM clearance teams were deployed to the same area in October 
2018, with AIM clearance operations beginning in November 2018 
following the receipt of accreditation from DMAC.
During this project, the HALO manual AIM clearance teams 
worked a total of 148 days and cleared 10,902 sq m across two AIM 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). This equates to an average clear-
ance rate of 73.7 sq m per day, or 9.5 sq m per deminer per day. During 
this time, the teams located and destroyed six emplaced AIMs, as-
sisted in the safe disposal of an AIM uncovered near a task by a lo-
cal farmer, and destroyed a main charge handed to the teams by the 
community. In addition, the survey team surveyed seventy-nine AIM 
CHAs with an average of 13,097 sq m per CHA and seven AIM sus-
pected hazardous areas (SHAs) with an average of 37,295 sq m per 
SHA. The AIM survey team also investigated fifty-two EO accidents 
around central Helmand Province, almost all of which are assessed to 
have been caused by AIM contamination.
This project provided HALO the opportunity to assess its initial 
clearance procedures and with minor adjustments, proved that the 
procedures would continue to be successful against the target devices 
in central Helmand Province. In addition, HALO has also been able 
to conduct field-testing of several specialist IED detectors. These spe-
cialist detectors include ground penetrating radar (GPR) detectors 
Image 8. A HALO AIM deminer conducts clearance in cen-
tral Helmand.
Image 9. A HALO AIM deminer excavating signals in a 2 m 
breach lane.
optimized for the detection of short buried wires (like those found 
in the majority of AIM components). The benefit to AIM clearance is 
the ability to ignore many of the irrelevant metal signals that would 
require excavation and significantly slow the rate of clearance in the 
semi-rural areas.
NEXT STEPS
HALO’s first AIM clearance project ended in June 2019, follow-
ing nearly eight months of clearance by two manual AIM clear-
ance teams and the release of two AIM contaminated areas. Having 
proved that AIM clearance is possible in Afghanistan, there are sev-
eral challenges to address next. One challenge is to improve the speed 
and versatility of the current AIM clearance procedures in order to 
reduce the risk of accidents within the civilian population, releasing 
land for safe use and development more quickly. The second major 
challenge is how to scale up AIM clearance within the country.
HALO is assessing a number of methods of improving the speed 
and versatility of AIM clearance processes in Afghanistan. In July 
and August 2019, HALO conducted initial trials of mechanical AIM 
clearance methods, drawing from the lessons learned from HALO 
Iraq, and building upon the extensive mechanical clearance expe-
rience already held by HALO Afghanistan. These trials were fur-
ther reinforced by additional trials in September and early October 
2019, before two mechanical AIM clearance teams were deployed to 
the field in mid-October 2019. To improve clearance speed, HALO 
will also continue trials with a number of specialist IED detectors 
and search techniques. In September 2019, all HALO AIM demin-
ers were trained in building and compound clearance techniques, 
enableing them to clear AIM contamination in the enclosed spaces 
that are accessed to be present on a high proportion of AIM clear-
ance tasks in Afghanistan.
 In order to scale up AIM clearance, MAPA is working with do-
nors to raise awareness of the humanitarian need for AIM clearance. 
To assist, HALO is sharing the lessons identified during the proof of 
concept project through MAPA’s AIM Technical Working Group. 
HALO will also continue conducting capacity development of oth-
ers, such as the recent partnering and training of another operator to 
deliver AIM NTS for UNMAS. HALO will continue to develop its 
humanitarian AIM clearance capacity and to share lessons with 
partners, enabling the mine aciton sector to meet this urgent hu-
manitarian need as soon as possible. 
See endnotes page 61
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The most deployed detection technology for landmine clear-ance is the metal detector (MD).1 Other detection technol-ogies exist, such as ground penetrating radar,2 chemical 
sensors,3 biological sensors,4 and infrared imaging,5 to name a few. 
However, despite their widespread use, MDs suffer from high false-
alarm (FA) rates since they cannot differentiate between the metal 
components in a landmine and harmless metal clutter. Deminers us-
ing MDs usually rely on their personal experience to differentiate be-
tween the sounds emitted by the MD when scanning a landmine or 
an item of clutter. Usually, they continue to excavate on a large num-
ber of occasions and end up finding a harmless piece of metal. For 
each found landmine, it is estimated that a hundred to a thousand 
false positives are encountered.6 The high FA rate substantially slows 
the demining process and increases costs. This delays the recovery of 
A Real-Time 
VIDEO-STREAMING SYSTEM 
for Monitoring Demining 
contaminated land and the resumption of everyday activities around 
the affected areas.
Despite the training and the protocols that are put into place to 
make the demining process safe, accidents do happen during clear-
ance operations.7 Preventing or at least minimizing the number of 
accidents is essential. When an accident happens, it is necessary to 
know exactly what happened and why it happened. This helps deter-
mine responsibility and prevent similar accidents in the future.
In this article, the authors present a real-time video transmission 
system—the Demining Monitoring System (DMS)—that can be used 
to closely monitor the activities of deminers during humanitarian 
landmine clearance. This system comprises a high-resolution video 
camera and a wireless transmitter that can be placed on the deminer’s 
helmet, chest, or shoulder as well as wireless receivers and a digital 
SBC SDR
Amplifier
Channel 1
SBC SDR
Amplifier
Channel N
Figure 1. Diagram showing the components of the video-streaming subsystem. Each deminer using the system will be equipped with 
one of these subsystems.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
by Mohammed Al-Husseini, Ph.D., Masoud Alipour, Ph.D., Hassan Ghaziri, Ph.D., [ Beirut Research 
and Innovation Center, Lebanese Center for Studies and Research, ] and Ali El-Hajj, Ph.D. 
[ Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, American University of Beirut ]
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video recorder (DVR) at a base station. This enables supervisors to re-
motely view what the deminers are doing in real time, while also re-
cording the video streams from all deminers. These can be used to 
help determine the cause of accidents, as well as train deminers un-
der normal circumstances. This work is done in collaboration with the 
Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), which assisted by providing 
the logistics to test the DMS in the field.8
DEMINING MONITORING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The DMS was conceived after several accidents involving deminers 
occurred over a short period of time during clearance operations. The 
causes of the incidents were hard to determine, which delayed further 
clearance work and complicated the work of the insurance companies 
expected to pay compensations to the injured deminers. The moni-
toring system comprises two main subsystems: the video-streaming 
subsystem and the base station. Each deminer is equipped with a video- 
streaming subsystem. The base station receives and records the video 
streams from all deminers, and has the ability to forward the video to 
remote locations such as the headquarters of the demining group.
VIDEO-STREAMING SUBSYSTEM
The video-streaming subsystems consist of high-quality digital 
cameras connected to single-board computers (SBCs). Also con-
nected to each SBC is a software-defined radio (SDR), which is a 
radio-communication system. The components of this system are 
implemented on a general-purpose embedded system using soft-
ware, instead of being implemented as special-purpose hardware.9 
Examples of such components include mixers, filters, modulators, 
and demodulators to name a few. The main advantage of the SDR is 
that some of its functions can be changed or upgraded during oper-
ation via software, without the need to change the hardware. In our 
video-streaming subsystems, SDR output is connected to a power 
amplifier interfaced to a transmitting antenna. A lightweight bat-
tery directly powers the SBC and the power amplifier, whereas the 
SDR is powered by the SBC. A diagram of the video-streaming sub-
system is shown in Figure 1.
The SBC receives the digital-data stream from the camera and runs 
Python, a programming language that controls the function of the 
SDR. With the help of Python, the SDR takes the camera’s video 
stream and transforms it into a Digital Video Broadcast-Terrestrial 
(DVB-T) transmission, which is fed to the input of the power ampli-
fier. DVB-T is the European Standard for the transmission of digital 
terrestrial television, which has proven to be a successful and reliable 
digital video transmission standard. The amplifier augments the power 
of the transmission, allowing it to reach longer distances, beyond the 
safety distance set between deminers and supervisors. The antenna at 
the output of the amplifier transmits the signal into the air.
The SDR not only enables the selection of the transmission stan-
dard (DVB-T in this case) via software but also allows the operator 
to set the transmission frequency using this software. The ability to 
Image 1. Photo of the SDR chip inside a USB 3.0-to-VGA adapter.
Image 2. A camera is attached to the side of the visor.
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select the transmission frequency is essential to distinguishing the 
channels of the different deminers’ video streams, thus limiting in-
terference and also allowing the operator to choose the frequency 
band for the whole system operation. DVB-T offers improved picture 
quality and spectral efficiency, which is essential for the demining 
application when there are transmissions from several deminers at 
the same time in a small geographical area. DVB-T is also power-
efficient, which is a plus for our application, since the transmitter is 
equipped with only a lightweight battery.
SBCs are ubiquitous and inexpensive. For example, a Raspberry 
Pi Zero costs only a few dollars. Moreover, SDRs are becoming less 
expensive and widespread. An inexpensive SDR chip is available in 
a USB 3.0-to-VGA adapter and is used in the video-streaming sub-
system. A photo of the SDR chip inside a USB 3.0 to VGA adapter 
is shown in Image 1. The selection of these components also helps 
to keep the overall cost of the system below an acceptable threshold. 
The camera can be attached to the visor, on the shoulder of the de-
miner, or on their chest. The other components (SBC, SDR, and am-
plifier) are all housed in a small box, which can be mounted on the 
back of the deminer’s vest. A cable runs from the camera to the com-
ponents box. The antenna can be a simple monopole directly connect-
ed to this box or can be a specially-designed wearable-patch antenna 
made on the back of the vest. Image 2 shows a photo of a camera 
connected to the side of a visor. A positioning feature (using GPS or 
similar services) can also be added to this subsystem to pinpoint the 
locations of each deminer at the time of recording.
BASE STATION SUBSYSTEM
The base station comprises a multi-channel DVB-T receiver con-
nected to a DVR. The DVR has a hard disk installed inside it, which 
is where the different streams are recorded. A second output of the 
DVB-T is connected to a monitor to view the different streams in a 
grid, with the ability to select the number of viewed streams or view 
only one of them maximized on the monitor. An antenna is attached 
at the input of the DVB-T receiver. Since the received signals have 
very low powers, a high-gain antenna should be used as a receiver, and 
should be capable of picking up signals from wide-azimuth angles. A 
high-gain monopole antenna can be used, but for better performance, 
a single-module slotted-waveguide antenna,10 or its lighter and print-
ed counterpart, the substrate-integrated waveguide antenna,11 can be 
employed instead. The estimated time delay between the camera tak-
ing the video and viewing the video on the base-station monitor is 
about 300 milliseconds (0.3 seconds), which gives the feel of real-time 
viewing. The base station also has the ability to forward the received 
streams via WiFi or a 4G network to either a mobile supervisor with 
a laptop or tablet, or to a remote location such as the headquarters 
of the demining group. Figure 2 shows the components of the base- 
station subsystem.
DESIGN CHALLENGES
Several cameras with video-streaming capabilities already ex-
ist in the market. However, these devices are not suitable for mine 
action. The main reason is that most of these devices use the WiFi 
To Mobile Supervisor or HQ
Multi-channel 
DVB-T Receiver DVR
Figure 2. Diagram showing the components of the base station.
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standard for their transmissions, which limits their coverage distance 
to below the safety distance imposed in demining. The devices that 
operate in the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band are mostly analog, 
which makes them prone to external noise. Moreover, the picture 
quality degrades due to obstacles like hills and vegetation. The second 
issue with UHF streaming is the limited band, which does not allow 
several transmissions from different deminers in separate channels.
A solution is to use SDRs to program each camera subsystem to 
transmit at different frequencies, and to select the band in which the 
whole system (base station plus all transmitters) operates. This is use-
ful for the operators to select the frequency band that they are allowed 
to use. Employing DVB-T, which is a digital system, gives users all the 
advantages of DVB-T including spectral and power efficiency, in ad-
dition to noise resistance and operational functionality in rough ter-
rain and thick vegetation. Furthermore, in devising this solution, the 
authors sought to keep the system cost low, which translated into the 
selection of inexpensive albeit quality components.
CONCLUSION
A first prototype of the system has already been assembled but is 
still ongoing lab testing and fine-tuning. An additional field test, with 
the help of LMAC, is scheduled for the first quarter of 2020. A rug-
gedized industrial-grade prototype will be fabricated afterward and 
will also be field tested. Different demining agencies will inspect this 
new prototype to poll their opinions on the functioning of the system, 
areas in which it could be improved, additional features to be added, 
and more importantly, the practicality of the system in real-life dem-
ining contexts. 
The authors would like to thank the Lebanon Mine Action Center 
(LMAC) for providing all the necessary logistics to test the system in 
the field, and Mr. Stuart Henley for his technical support and guidance 
throughout this work. 
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Editorial: Empowering Local Capacity in Mine Action
With explosive hazards contamination persisting in spite of dwindling funding 
opportunities, sustainable solutions are becoming increasingly more import-
ant. Similarly, creating mine action programs and centers that can be relied 
upon to pick up the reigns after foreign clearance organizations and contractors 
have left is of paramount importance. What lessons learned can the community 
share in regards to building national capacity and employing locals to continue 
operations after projects have concluded?
Balkans
Organizations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro are encouraged to submit on their current programs, challenges, 
and successes. 
Environmental Concerns of Explosives
War and conflict have obvious negative effects on the human communities in 
which they occur, but the effects that ammunition and explosives can have on 
the environment are less evident. How does explosive contamination affect the 
environment, how do explosive detonations affect the physical and chemical 
properties of ground soils, and what measures can MA operators take to reduce 
these effects?
HMA and CWD in the Context of IDPs and Migration
How can HMA/CWD programs better adapt to the return of IDPs, and how are 
countries/organizations addressing migration as it occurs across mined borders 
and contaminated areas?
Demining in Dense Terrain
Freedom of movement remains restricted in some forest and jungle areas of 
the Balkans, Ukraine, and Colombia, endangering human life, damaging the 
ecosystem, and increasing the risk of fires. The Journal seeks submissions from 
organizations operating in these areas.
Management Information Systems and/or On-Site Analytical Tools
Management information systems differ from information management sys-
tems in that they are used for decision making as opposed to information stor-
age. How are organizations using decision-assisting technologies to analyze 
and interpret data and efficiently allocating resources to the field?
Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and 
development (R&D) articles. All technical articles on current equipment, 
technology, trends, and developments in the field of mine action and CWD will 
be considered. Commercial companies, NGO’s, and researchers are encouraged 
to submit. R&D articles are submitted to three experts for anonymous peer 
review and two of the three reviewers must approve the article for publication. 
Reviewers approve articles for publication, suggest revisions, or reject articles 
for publication.
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Battle Area Clearance/Urban Clearance/Urban Survey
Organizations conducting recent battle area clearance/urban clearance are 
encouraged to submit. Discussion of surface search, threat assessments, 
security, mitigating risks, reporting, quality management, and technology 
within unique, complex environments is encouraged.
Accidents and Investigations
IMAS 10.60 requires that “an accident in which a mine, ERW or explosives 
harms a demining employee, visitor, or member of the local population” shall 
be investigated and the report made available. In mine action, all reasonable 
effort should be made to reduce the risk to the deminer. When accidents and 
incidents occur, how does your organization identify and investigate the cause? 
How can requirements for reporting be improved? How does data obtained from 
A&I reports provide insight into trends that can help promote good practice in 
the field?
Prosthetics
Academics, organizations, and individuals working with prosthetics in 
humanitarian mine action are encouraged to submit articles on the use of 
prosthetics in HMA. Topics may include the latest technological advances, 
prosthetics within the context of mine action legislation, effects of decreased 
funding for victim assistance, integration of disability support services in HMA.  
Mobile and/or Efficient Data Collection Methods
Collecting data via mobile technology such as iPads and other tablets has 
increasingly become the standard; moreover, thoughtfully created data 
collection forms drastically improves the efficiency and efficacy of data recording.
Caucasus
Organizations are encouraged to submit on their programs operating in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
Developing Partnerships and Sustainable 
National Capacity
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable 
Development Goals provide framework for integration of mine action in national 
development plans. How can organizations working in HMA gain trust in local 
communities and sustainably build programs that will not be mismanaged but 
held accountable for future work?
Commercial Off-the-Shelf Tools for Mine Action
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products require minimum adaption and 
save on development costs. Submissions on COTS products used in HMA are 
encouraged.
Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and development 
(R&D) articles. All technical articles on current equipment, technology, trends, 
and developments in the field of mine action and CWD will be considered. 
Commercial companies, NGO’s, and researchers are encouraged to submit. R&D 
articles are submitted to three experts for anonymous peer review and two of 
the three reviewers must approve the article for publication. Reviewers approve 
articles for publication, suggest revisions, or reject articles for publication.
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source or publication.
Authors who submit articles to The Journal are expected to do so in good faith 
and are solely responsible for the content therein, including the accuracy of all 
information and correct attribution for quotations and citations. 
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The Journal invites government bodies, nongovernment orga-
nizations, military personnel, researchers, academics, and 
industry experts to contribute their articles or case studies. 
We are actively looking for practice-based contributions.
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Editorial: The Oslo Review Conference - The Fourth Review Conference 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention commemorates the APMBC’s 20th an-
niversary since entering into force. Held in Oslo, Norway, in November 2019, the 
Fourth Review Conference presents the HMA sector with an opportunity to con-
sider the scope of work that remains in order to realize the tenets first negotiated 
in 1997—to save lives, promote sustainable development in affected areas, and to 
assist survivors. Since the APMBC went into effect in 1999, how has the HMA com-
munity changed to meet the needs of an ever-changing sector? Does the HMA sec-
tor currently possess the capacity to help States Parties adequately and efficiently 
achieve the terms outlined in the APMBC? Submissions discussing what progress 
has been made, as well as the challenges that remain are encouraged. 
Mine Action in the Public Eye - In 1997, Princess Diana advocated for 
those suffering from landmines in Angola and Bosnia, raising awareness of the 
humanitarian issue surrounding landmine contamination. Similarly, retracing his 
mother’s footsteps, Prince Harry’s September 2019 visit to Angola drew global me-
dia attention to the ongoing humanitarian crisis of landmines and other explosive 
remnants of war. But what happens after the media spotlight dims? How can HMA 
organizations leverage stories at the country level to help advocate for resources 
that will advance the sector’s goals and its beneficiaries? Raising attention of the 
people most affected by landmine contamination through human impact stories 
and advancing the HMA narrative by showing how explosive hazards clearance af-
fects individual communities can raise support and leverage assets. Every organiza-
tion involved in HMA has hundreds of stories at the country level to share with the 
global community—tell us yours.
Africa - The Journal seeks submissions on organizations’ programs in Democrat-
ic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Senegal, 
and Zimbabwe. Of particular interest are articles operating specifically in Ango-
la, focusing on demining efforts, survey, physical security and stockpile manage-
ment, information management, and victim assistance.
Robotics and Remote Sensing - Used to assist in identifying potential 
contamination, as well as in planning and monitoring and evaluation of clearance 
operations, The Journal encourages submissions on the latest technological ad-
vances.
Victim Assistance and Disability Rights Integration in HMA, Legal 
Frameworks, and Capacity Building - What issues around VA need to 
be addressed within the current context of HMA? How can VA be integrated into 
broader disability and development frameworks? Building on the foundation from 
the Maputo Action Plan, what challenges, opportunities, and expectations does 
the Oslo Action Plan set forth?
Physical Security and Stockpile Management - Topics of interest in-
clude: mentoring and evaluation, developing national capacities, ammunition 
management training, monitoring, database systems, successes, challenges, etc. 
Articles focusing on ammunition management/storage are encouraged. 
Low-Order EOD Techniques/Sustainable Methods of Destruction
Many programs face issues finding in-country explosives as high explosives are 
increasingly not permitted for disposal operations and alternatives are becoming 
expensive. Programs operating with low-order EOD techniques are encouraged 
to submit.
Humanitarian Mine Action Training Centers/Sites: Best Practices 
and Standards - Organizations are encouraged to submit on their training cen-
ters as well as on-site training grounds for in-country personnel. 64
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